How Section 469 Redefines the Tax Shelter - and How the Regulations Redefine Section 469 by Donnelly, Thomas J.
Volume 34 Issue 6 Article 4 
1989 
How Section 469 Redefines the Tax Shelter - and How the 
Regulations Redefine Section 469 
Thomas J. Donnelly 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas J. Donnelly, How Section 469 Redefines the Tax Shelter - and How the Regulations Redefine 
Section 469, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 1163 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1989]
Comments
HOW SECTION 469 REDEFINES THE TAX SHELTER-AND
HOW THE REGULATIONS REDEFINE SECTION 469
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tax Reform Act of 19861 was intended to restore simplicity,
fairness and efficiency to the federal income tax laws. 2 These objectives
were facilitated through broad reductions in income tax rates and an
aggressive attack on tax shelters.3 However, while the equitable impact
of rate reduction has received mixed reviews, 4 a consensus has formed
against the complex and sometimes inequitable passive loss provisions 5
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§§ 1-9602 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 16, 1954,
ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3) [hereinafter 1986 Act].
2. TAx REFORM ACT OF 1986-REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
UNITED STATES SENATE TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3838 TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL
VIEWS, S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 [hereinafter 1986 SENATE FI-
NANCE COMMITTEE REPORT]. To substantiate the inequities of the current tax
system the Senate Report cited a study conducted by the Department of the
Treasury which found that of the taxpayers reporting in excess of $250,000 of
"total positive income" (defined as the sum of salary, dividends, interest and
income from profitable business ventures), 11% paid federal income tax equal
to 5% or less of "total positive income," and 21% paid federal income tax of
10% or less of this figure. Id. at 714. Other studies characterized tax shelters as
vehicles used by the rich to substantially reduce their tax liabilities. Id. at 714
n.4 (citingJoiNT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: TAX SHEL-
TERS AND MINIMUM TAX (August 7, 1985)).
The 1986 Senate Finance Committee Report forwarded these studies as
proof that the "progressive tax [system] was a fraud," allowing those who pos-
sessed investment income to effectively shelter themselves from paying their fair
share. Doernberg & McChesney, Book Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 916
(1987) (reviewing J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GuccI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 10 (1987)).
However, to characterize the pre-1986 Act as unprogressive contradicts previ-
ous Treasury studies showing taxpayers with the top 5% in taxable income as
paying 38.5% of all individual income taxes paid, and the top 10% paying
51.8% of the bill. Id. (citing Tax Found., News Release, Shouldering the Burden-
Who Pays the Tax Bill? 1 (July 24, 1987)). Could our system be too progressive;
are the rich paying too much? Interestingly, the "rich," top 10% in taxable in-
come, encompass taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes as low as $47,000. Id.
at 917.
3. 1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
4. For an affirmative view on rate reduction, see id. at 3-4 & 29-44. For an
example of legislators' concerns over the equity of rate reduction, see 132 CONG.
REC. S13919, S13921 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sens. Sasser and
Harkin).
5. See, e.g., Lipton, More Fun and Games with PALs: The First Set of Section 469
Regulations, 66 TAXES 235 (1988); see also Dees, Mezullo, Seely et al., Comments on
(1163)
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introduced to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code") 6 under
section 469. 7
Section 469 was drafted with the premise that an activity's tax bene-
fits should be currently available only to those taxpayers whose participa-
tion went beyond funding investment capital. 8 While a simple concept,
this was an innovative approach which necessitated the development of
new concepts. Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (the "Ser-
vice") were forced to develop these new concepts, the most prominent
and troublesome being "material participation, '" "significant participa-
tion activity" 10 and the definition of an "activity."' 1 It is these concepts,
which are devoid of any previous regulatory or judicial construction,
which provide the primary source for the statute's and regulation's most
complex and questionable provisions.
This Comment will focus primarily on the Service's first installment
of passive activity regulations concerning the statute's "material partici-
pation" prong. This Comment's objective is to provide a pragmatic
view of questions presented by the statute and material participation
regulations in order to supply a starting point for the identification of,
and preparation for, passive activity loss issues. It will be demonstrated
Passive Activity Loss Regulations, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. ON TAX'N-PAsSIVE Loss TASK
FORCE 3-4 [hereinafter PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE] (comments represent views
held by individual members of Special Task Force on Passive Activity Losses and
not those necessarily held by the American Bar Association or its Section of
Taxation).
6. I.R.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (originally enacted as Act of
Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3).
7. I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1989). For the legislative background of the
1986 Act, see 1986 Act, supra note 1, §§ 501-502; TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986-
CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3838, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 11-134 through II-157 [hereinafter 1986 CONFERENCE REPORT];
1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 713-46.
8. 1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 715.
9. Section 469 applies only to "passive activities." A passive activity is de-
fined as "any activity ... which involves the conduct of any trade or business" (a
concept well defined by case law under I.R.C. § 162) and "in which the taxpayer
does not materially participate." I.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989). The
statute defines material participation as involvement which is "regular, ... con-
tinuous, and . . .substantial." Id. § 469(h)(1).
10. For a discussion of "significant participation activity," see infra notes
103-16 and accompanying text.
11. The concepts of "material participation" and "activity" represent the
two fundamental pillars upon which the passive activity rules were constructed.
This Comment focuses on "material participation" as defined by the Service's
first installment of proposed and temporary regulations under § 469. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.469-1T to -3T, -5T, -1 IT, 53 Fed. Reg. 5686-5733 (1988).
While the Service's recently issued second installment defining "activity," see
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4T, 54 Fed. Reg. 20,527-66 (1989), intertwines with
its "material participation" counterpart, the two concepts are sufficiently auton-
omous to allow for separate analysis. Therefore, while "activity" issues im-
pacting the "material participation" analysis will be identified, further analysis of
the "activity" regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment.
1164 [Vol. 34: p. 1163
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that the most fertile planning opportunities present themselves as alter-
natives to questionable positions adopted by the regulations. However,
as a prerequisite to the above analysis, this Comment will first outline
section 469's statutory scheme, followed by a review of the Code's nu-
merous other tax shelter provisions and an analysis of how section 469
integrates with these other provisions.
II. THE SECTION 469 STATUTORY SCHEME
Section 469 suspends the recognition of a net passive activity loss
incurred by any individual, estate, trust, 12 closely held corporation, 13 or
any personal service corporation. 14 Section 469 "freezes" a taxpayer's
net passive activity losses until released by a recognition event.' 5 These
frozen losses can be recognized in three ways. First, passive loss car-
ryforwards can be applied against the respective activity's future active
or passive (i.e., non-portfolio, non-personal service) income. 16 Second,
the carryforward can be utilized in any tax year in which the taxpayer has
net positive passive income from all his passive activities.17 Finally, the
activity's passive loss carryforward is released, and may shelter any class
of income, after the taxpayer has effected a disposition of his entire
interest. 18
Suspending net loss recognition until there has been a complete
disposition of the taxpayer's entire interest in the passive activity codi-
fies the congressional belief in the Code's inability to accurately measure
real annual economic losses, particularly those attributable to unrealized
appreciation.' 9 While provisions such as the adjusted basis and recap-
ture rules equalize prior years' distortions between taxable and eco-
nomic income, the taxpayer still reaps a timing benefit from pre-
disposition deductions. 20 To eliminate this timing benefit, section 469
12. The regulations exempt grantor trusts as described in I.R.C. § 671.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(b)(2) (1988).
13. "The term 'closely held corporation' means a corporation that meets
the stock ownership requirements of § 542(a)(2) (taking into account the modifi-
cations in § 465(a)(3)) for the taxable year and is not a personal service corpora-
tion for such year." Id. § 1.469-1T(g)(2)(ii).
14. "The term 'personal service corporation' means a corporation that is a
personal service corporation for the taxable year (within the meaning of [Treas.
Reg.] § 1.441-4T(d))." Id. § 1.469-IT(g)(2)(i). For the regulations' definition
of personal service corporations, see infra note 143.
15. I.R.C. § 469(a)(1), (b) (West Supp. 1989).
16. Id. § 469(f)(l)(A).
17. Id. § 469(b).
18. Id. § 469(g)(1)(A).
19. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 213 (Joint Comm. Print 1987)
[hereinafter 1986 BLUE BOOK].
20. The most common example of a tax benefit timing deduction is the de-
preciation deduction allowed on real property. For example, take the case of a
$100,000 building: assume a 28.5-year depreciable life, a constant marginal tax
19891 COMMENT 1165
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synchronizes tax loss recognition with economic realizations by defer-
ring recognition until there has been a disposition of the taxpayer's en-
tire interest in the activity.21
Congress developed the "passive activity loss" (PAL)22 concept as
the means for implementing this statutory scheme. A PAL occurs when
a taxpayer's total passive activity losses for the taxable year exceed his
total passive activity income. 23 The calculation of passive activity in-
come or loss (i.e., the specific items of income or loss to be used in the
calculation) incorporates section 469's guiding principle of segregating
passive losses from all other classes of income. 24 Accordingly, the stat-
ute requires identification and exclusion of all other classes of income,
namely personal service income 2 5 and portfolio income. 26 The statute's
rate of 28% and a fair market value at the end of the depreciable life cycle of
$100,000. Depreciation is designed to approximate economic exhaustion.
However, economic reality diverges from these tax assumptions when either the
asset appreciates or fails to depreciate as rapidly as provided for by the tax de-
preciation schedules. While the recapture provisions close this gap in the year
the asset is sold, they do not remove the timing benefits. For instance, in the
above example, if the taxpayer sells the building in year 28 for $100,000, the
recapture provisions will force a gain of $100,000 to be recognized. However,
this recapture does not reflect the time value of money benefit the taxpayer re-
ceived from the $28,000 in deferred taxes generated by deductions in years 1
through 28. By matching passive loss recognition with the asset's year of dispo-
sition, Congress hoped to deprive tax shelter investors of this time value of
money tax benefit.
21. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 213.
22. PALs, as used herein, refer to both passive activity losses and passive
activity credits, unless designated otherwise.
23. I.R.C. § 469(d) (West Supp. 1989).
24. Congress characterized the ability to offset positive income (e.g., salary
and portfolio income) with passive activity losses (i.e., losses from business activ-
ities in which the taxpayer did not "materially participate") as fundamental to
the tax shelter problem. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 212.
25. The regulations state that "[p]assive activity gross income does not in-
clude compensation paid to or on behalf of an individual for personal services
performed or to be performed by such individual at any time." Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.469-2T(c)(4)(i) (1988).
That regulation's application can be exemplified as follows: Assume Mr. A
has a distributable net passive loss of $ 10,000 from an S Corporation, and Mr. A
rendered 400 hours of management consulting services to the S Corporation for
which he was compensated $20,000. None of the $10,000 distributable net pas-
sive loss can offset the $20,000 of compensation income. See id. § 1.469-
2T(c)(4)(ii) (example).
26. I.R.C. § 469(e)(1) (West Supp. 1989). Portfolio income includes all
items of gross income and expense not derived in the original course of a trade
or business, attributable specifically to one of the following: (1) interest (includ-
ing § 707(c) interest payments on partner's capital); (2) annuities; (3) royalties
(including fees and other payments for the use of intangible property); (4) cor-
poration dividends; (5) real estate investment trust (REIT) income (including
dividends from any § 856 trust); (6) real estate mortgage investment conduit
(REMIC) (§ 851) mutual fund income; (7) REMIC (§ 850D) income; (8) com-
mon trust fund (§ 584) income; (9) controlled foreign corporation (§ 957) in-
come; (10) qualified electing fund (§ 1295(a)) income; (11) cooperative
1166 [Vol. 34: p. 1163
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emphasis on segregation favors those taxpayers who have activities
which can be classified as passive activity income generators (PIGs). 27
However, since PIGs are now the most favored form of activity among
taxpayers, the regulations attempt to narrow the classification as much
as possible, principally through the use of dubious recharacterization
schemes which effectively place the taxpayer in a no-win situation.2 8
Fundamental to the PAL concept is the definition of a "passive ac-
tivity." A non-rental activity 29 obtains passive status if it involves the
conduct of a trade or business and is an activity in which the taxpayer
does not materially participate. 30 While the "trade or business" concept
has been well defined by existing case law, 3 1 the regulations substan-
tially narrow the term in order to limit attempts to fabricate passive ac-
tivity income. 32 These regulations appear reasonable and have stirred
(§ 1381 (a)) income; (12) S Corporation (§ 1368(c)(2)) dividend income; (13) in-
come attributable to dispositions of any of the aforementioned income-produc-
ing items; (14) income attributable to the disposition of property held for
investment within the meaning of § 163(d). Id. § 469(c)(1), (e)(l); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.469-2T(c)(3)(i) (1988); see also Lipton & Evaul, I Passive Activity Losses,
TAX TRANSACTIONS LIBRARY (CCH) 902 (1988).
27. Activities which create net positive "passive activity income" are known
as passive income generators (PIGs). See, e.g., Rubin, Sticking PIGs: Real Estate
Under the Passive Loss Regulations, 39 TAX NOTES 867 (1988).
28. See, e.g., infra notes 107-32 and accompanying text. The preamble to
the Comments on Passive Activity Loss Regulations states that "although Congress
decreed that passive income should be available to be offset by passive losses,
the Regulations make a -serious effort to eliminate passive income through
recharacterization rules which rely on a 'heads Treasury wins, tails taxpayer
loses' rational." PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 11-12.
29. Rental activities are presumptively passive. See I.R.C. § 469(c)(2) (West
Supp. 1989).
30. Id. § 469(c)(1)(A)-(B). While the statute, by its provisions, would not
apply to an endeavor before such endeavor constituted a trade or business
under § 162, the newly issued activity regulations have amended the material
participation regulations to apply the provisions of § 469 to an endeavor con-
ducted in aniticipation of becoming a trade or business. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.469-4T(b)(2)(ii) (1989).
31. For a discussion of the case law concerning the definition of a trade or
business, see Lipton & Evaul, supra note 26, 401.01.
32. Regarding trade or business income, the temporary regulations
provide:
(ii) Solely for purposes of paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section, gross in-
come derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business includes
only-
(A) Interest income on loans and investments made in the ordi-
nary course of a trade or business of lending money;
(B) Interest on accounts receivable arising from the performance
of services or the sale of property in the ordinary course of a trade or
business of performing such services or selling such property, but only
if credit is customarily offered to customers of the business;
(C) Income from investments made in the ordinary course of a
trade or business of furnishing insurance or annuity contracts or rein-
suring risks underwritten by insurance companies;
(D) Income or gain derived in the ordinary course of an activity
1989] COMMENT 1167
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little debate.
By contrast, the introduction of an expanded material participation
concept has caused considerable debate.3 3 The concept's ambiguity is
helped little by the statute's own definition of material participation as
"involve[ment] in the operations of the activity on a ... regular, ...
continuous and ... substantial [basis]." 13 4 The concept is based on prior
usage within sections 1402(a) 35 and 2032A.3 6 However, the established
of trading or dealing in any property if such activity constitutes a trade
or business (but see paragraph (c)(3)(iii)(A) of this section);
(E) Royalties derived by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of a
trade or business of licensing intangible property (within the meaning
of paragraph (c)(3)(iii)(B) of this section);
(F) Amounts included in the gross income of a patron of a coop-
erative (within the meaning of section 1381 (a), without regard to para-
graph (2)(A) or (C) thereof) by reason of any payment or allocation to
the patron based on patronage occurring with respect to a trade or
business of the patron; and
(G) Other income identified by the Commissioner as income de-
rived by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of a trade or business.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2T(c)(3)(ii) (1988).
33. The debate caused by the statute is a function of the broad and ambigu-
ous language utilized in its key provisions. The most prominent questions
raised are: (1) What constitutes an "activity"? (e.g., If a taxpayer operates three
grocery stores, are they to be treated separately or integrated?); (2) What consti-
tutes "material participation?" (i.e., Did Congress intend a quantitative hours
spent approach, or was the quality of the time spent to be the controlling ele-
ment?); and (3) What are the guidelines for recharacterization? For a further
discussion of these provisions and the issues they present, see infra sections IV &
V.
34. I.R.C. § 469(h)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
35. Section 1402 imposes a tax on self-employment income (the counter-
part to the Social Security tax withheld from an employee's income). In general,
self-employment income consists of an individual's net earnings from a trade or
business carried on either alone or in general partnership. Treas. Reg. §
1.1402(a)-l(a) (1988). Rentals from real estate and related personal property
generally are excluded from self-employment income. However, rentals for land
are classified as self-employment income if three conditions are met: (1) they
are derived under a contract to produce agricultural or horticultural commodi-
ties; (2) the rental contract requires material participation of the owner or tenant in
either production or management; and (3) there is actual material participation by
the owner or tenant. Id. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(1).
The § 1402 regulations provide that periodic (as opposed to regular under
§§ 2032A and 469) physical or managerial involvement, and furnishing required
capital, is all that is necessary to establish material participation. Id. § 1.1402(a)-
4(b)(3). The regulations' leniency is dictated by a taxpayer's desire to avoid ma-
terial participation classification in order to have the rental payments excluded
from self-employment income. Therefore, the cross purposes of the material
participation concepts under §§ 1402(a) and 469 diminish the use of analytical
comparisons.
36. Section 2032A provides an alternative estate tax valuation for real
property used in farming or other closely held businesses. I.R.C. § 2032A (West
1989). Among other requirements, § 2032A is only available where there was
material participation and a qualified use of the farming or closely held business by
the decedent or member of decedent's family for at least five out of the eight
years prior to death (with a qualified use on the date of death). Id. § 2032A(b).
1168 [Vol. 34: p. 1163
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precedents under those provisions are not dispositive of material partici-
pation under section 469. Congress intended 3 7 the statute's regular,
continuous and substantial involvement criteria to be interpreted as ex-
panding the concept's usage within section 469 beyond its current inter-
pretations under sections 1402(a) or 2032A.38 This extension beyond
established usages has raised interpretative questions as to how far, and
in what manner, Congress intended to alter the term's current meaning.
While the ultimate determination of congressional intent is for the
courts, the statute's extensive delegation of interpretive authority to the
Secretary of the Treasury39 makes the regulations the current focus of
attention. 40 The manner in which the Secretary has exercised this
The benefits of alternative valuation are contingent upon continued qualified
use and material participation for at least 10 years. Id. § 2032A(c).
As compared with regulations under § 1402(a), the § 2032A regulations are
much more restrictive in order to limit taxpayer access to material participation
status. Therefore, in contrast to § 1402(a), the pro-taxpayer posture of
§ 2032A's material participation standard causes § 2032A to be a more appro-
priate model of the congressional intent for the standard under § 469. For a
discussion of material participation, see infra notes 150-64 and accompanying
text.
37. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 237.
38. See 1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMrIrEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 732; see
also infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.
39. Section 469(/) provides:
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
or appropriate to carry out provisions of this section, including regula-
tions-
(1) which specify what constitutes an activity, material participation, or
active participation for purposes of this section,
(2) which provide that certain items of gross income will not be
taken into account in determining income or loss from any activity (and
the treatment of expenses allocable to such income),
(3) requiring net income or gain from a limited partnership or
other passive activity to be treated as not from a passive activity,
(4) which provide for the determination of the allocation of inter-
est expense for purposes of this section, and
(5) which deal with changes in marital status and changes be-
tween joint returns and separate returns.
I.R.C. § 469(l) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
40. Regulations can be broadly categorized into two distinct classes: those
which are "interpretative" and those which are "legislative." Westin, Dubious
Interpretative Rules for Construing Federal Taxing Statutes, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
17 (1981) (citing Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retro-
activity-A View From Within, 43 TAXES 756 (1965)).
Absent a specific statutory directive, the Secretary nonetheless may issue
rules and regulations for any Code provision pursuant to his general rule-mak-
ing power under § 7805(a). Regulations issued pursuant to this power are
termed interpretative. Although these interpretative regulations do not have the
force of law, they are accorded some weight. Id. at 18.
Legislative regulations, on the other hand, are issued pursuant to the direc-
tive of a specific Code provision (e.g., § 469(l)). Id. at 17. As a consequence they
are regarded as having the status of law, and therefore are presumed correct and
seldom invalidated. Id. at 17 n. 133 (quotingJ. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION 13 (2d ed. 1973)).
7
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power will be the focus of upcoming sections.
III. EXISTING TAX SHELTER PROVISIONS
A review of existing tax shelter provisions will provide an apprecia-
tion of the extent to which the passive loss provisions have extended the
tax shelter concept. This historical backdrop will frame the tax shelter
problem from a congressional viewpoint and supply a reference point
from which the legislative intent for section 469 can be assessed.
Pre-1986 Act tax shelter provisions have two forms: quantitative
and qualitative. The former relies upon a quantitative formula to cap a
taxpayer's overall benefit from tax preference items,4 ' while the latter
generally tries to disallow tax benefits derived from improperly moti-
vated investments.
A. Quantitative Provisions
1. The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)-Sections 55-59
The AMT is a parallel system of income taxation designed to ensure
that taxpayers who have claimed substantial tax preference deductions
and credits pay at least a minimum level of tax.4 2 To arrive at alterna-
tive minimum taxable income, 43 the AMT recalculates ordinary taxable
income through an addback of deductions designated as tax preference
items. 44 Tax shelter investors are generally sensitive to the AMT, in
that most tax shelters are designed to generate substantial tax prefer-
ence items.4 5
2. Limitation on Investment Interest-Section 163(d)
Investment interest expense is defined as "any interest... which is
paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or
41. Tax preference items are deductions and credits which have been
granted preferential treatment by the Code, generally created by Congress to
benefit a specific class of taxpayer. [1989 Index] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
300.09, at 8818; see also S. LEIMBERG, M. SATINSKY, J. IVERS, E. KRADER & A.
PARKER, STANLEY & KILCULLEN'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW 2-28 (1988) [herein-
after STANLEY & KILCULLEN].
42. [1989 Index] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 41, $ 300.09, at 8818; see
also STANLEY & KILCULLEN, supra note 41, at 2-27.
43. See I.R.C. § 56 (West Supp. 1989) (listing specific adjustments neces-
sary for computing taxpayer's alternative minimum taxable income).
44. Tax preference items are detailed in I.R.C. § 57.
45. [1989 Index] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 41, 1 300.03, at 8805.
1170 [Vol. 34: p. 1163
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carry property held for investment." '4 6 The frequent use of leverage 47
in tax shelters' capital structures has given the investment interest limi-
tation rules a significant impact in this area.4 8 A taxpayer's aggregate
investment interest expense is deductible only to the extent of net in-
vestment income.4 9 This provision parallels the passive loss rules in
that it isolates a specific character of income or expense, and prevents
investment interest deductions from sheltering any non-investment
income.
3. The At Risk Rules-Section 465
Most tax shelters are designed around a leveraged capital structure.
To the extent that a capital structure was leveraged with nonrecourse
financing, 50 tax shelter investors, prior to enactment of section 465,
could generate total deductions in excess of their actual economic expo-
sure.5' In response, Congress created the section 465 at risk rules to
limit at investor's aggregate deductions from any specific activity to his
personal liability in that activity. Its most fundamental premise, in this
regard, is that a taxpayer is generally not at risk with respect to nonre-
course debt or indemnified liabilities.5 2
46. I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1989). Section 163(d)(5)(A) speci-
fies that for purposes of the subsection (dealing with limitation on investment
interest) the term "property held for investment" shall include
(i) any property which produces income of a type described in section
469(e)(1), and
(ii) any interest held by a taxpayer in an activity involving the conduct
of a trade or business-
(I) which is not a passive activity, and
(II) with respect to which the taxpayer does not materially
participate.
Id. § 163(d)(5)(A). Section 469(e)(1) specifies interest, dividends, annuities or
royalties not derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business, as well as any
gain or loss from the sale of such property or any property held for investment.
Id. § 469(e)(1).
In very general terms, the investment interest rules provide that a taxpayer's
allowable deduction cannot exceed his net investment income (§ 163(d)(1)), and
that unused deductions are to be carried forward (§ 163(d)(2)).
47. "Leverage," in the business sense, is the intensification of an entity's
return or loss on equity through use of debt. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 816 (5th
ed. 1979). For example, assume company "A" is capitalized with $100 in stock,
while company "B" has $10 in stock and $90 in bonds. If company "A" earned
$15, and company "B" earned $5 ($15 less $10 in interest expense), company
"A" would have a 15% return on equity while company "B" would have a 50%
return on equity.
48. [1989 Index] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 41, $ 300.09, at 8818.
49. I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
50. Nonrecourse financing is a "[t]ype of security loan which bars the
lender from action against the borrower if the security value falls below the
amount required to repay the loan." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 953 (5th ed.
1979).
51. [1989 Index] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 41, 300.07, at 8814.
52. Id.; see also 1986 Act, supra note 1, § 503(a) (striking § 465(c)(3)(D)-
1989] COMMENT 1171
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4. Depreciation Recapture-Section 1245
One of the cornerstones of tax shelters is the ability to depreciate
assets at an accelerated rate,5 3 while the property being depreciated en-
joys real economic appreciation-the most common example being real
estate.5 4 The recapture provisions prevent a double benefit (i.e., an or-
dinary deduction coupled with a subsequent capital gain) by
recharacterizing as ordinary income that portion of any realized gain
which is attributable to prior years' depreciation deductions. 55
B. Qualitative Provisions
While the preceding quantitative limitations effectively limit a tax-
payer's tax preference item benefit, they generally fail to distinguish be-
tween the classes of taxpayers receiving the benefit. For example,
quantitative limitations fail to distinguish between the family farmer
from Wisconsin and the gentleman farmer from Wall Street. They focus
on very narrow and specific abuses of the tax system.
However, the 1986 Act shifted from rules governing specific tax
preference item abuses to the broad-based material participation con-
cept embodied in section 469. The intent was to restrict tax preference
benefits to those whom Congress had intended, i.e., those taxpayers with
a "bona fide involvement in the activities to which the preferences
related."5 6
removing real estate's exemption from the at risk rules). However, while the
1986 Act removed real estate's blanket exemption from the at risk rules, it did
supply some relief in the form of qualified nonrecourse financing under
§ 465(b)(6). If an activity acquires qualified nonrecourse financing within the
scope of § 465(b)(6), the taxpayer is then considered at risk with respect to such
amounts; however, any non-qualified nonrecourse liabilities will be subject to
the at risk limitations. See I.R.C. § 465 (West 1988).
53. "Depreciation" is the write-off of the cost or other basis of an asset over
its estimated useful life. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 397 (5th ed. 1979). Acceler-
ated depreciation methods yield larger deductions in an asset's earlier years (rel-
ative to a straight-line method), balanced by proportionately smaller deductions
in the later years. Therefore, the estimated useful life and degree of acceleration
will impact upon the attractiveness of an investment where the investor is con-
cerned with maximizing tax preference items in the earlier years, as is the case
with a tax shelter investor. The 1986 Act reduced depreciation benefits by ex-
tending recovery periods, although the effect was mitigated in some areas by
allowing for a more rapid/accelerated write-off. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19,
at 99-104. But the 1986 Act dealt a triple blow to depreciable real estate, the
most popular form of tax shelter investment, by extending recovery periods
(from 19 years to 27.5 and 31.5 years for residential and non-residential prop-
erty, respectively), mandating the straight-line write-off method, and repealing
real estate's exemption from the at risk rules. Id. at 102-03.
54. [1989 Index] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 41, 300.09, at 8819.
55. Section 1245 requires recapture of all ordinary depreciation deduc-
tions, while § 1250, which covers realty, recaptures only the accelerated depreci-
ation deducted in excess of that allowable using the straight-line method. I.R.C.
§§ 1245, 1250 (West Supp. 1989).
56. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 212 (emphasis in original).
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The passive loss rules extend the tax shelter concept from entities
designed to maximize tax preferences to any entity which shifted any
deduction, preferenced or ordinary,5 7 to any individual who was not a "ma-
terial participant" in the activity. 5 8 This expanded view transcended ex-
isting quantitative provisions, as recognized by Congress in its
distinction between the issues of a taxpayer's at risk limitation and his
status as a material participant in an activity. 59 However, while section
469's material participant concept is far more expansive than any ex-
isting quantitative limitation, the pre-1986 Code was not without the
quantitative tools necessary to effect a similar result-principally section
183.
57. Section 469's legislative history characterizes the question of what con-
stitutes a tax shelter "as closely related to the question of who Congress intends
to benefit when it enacts tax preferences." Id. at 211 (emphasis added). The pas-
sive loss rules encompass any loss from an activity-whether preferenced or or-
dinary in nature.
The passive loss rule applies to all deductions that are from passive activi-
ties, including deductions allowed under sections 162, 163, 164 and
165. For example, deductions for State and local property taxes in-
curred with respect to passive activities are subject to limitation under
the passive loss rule whether such deductions are claimed above-the-
line or as itemized deductions under section 164.
Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 211.
59. Id. at 213. The distinction between at risk (§ 465) and material partici-
pation was described as follows:
The distinction that Congress determined should be drawn be-
tween activities on the basis of material participation was viewed as un-
related to the question of whether, and to what extent, the taxpayer was
at risk with respect to the activities. In general, the fact that a taxpayer
placed a particular amount at risk in an activity did not establish, prior
to a disposition of the taxpayer's interest, that the amount invested, or
any amount, had as yet been lost. The fact that a taxpayer was potentially
liable with respect to future expenses or losses of the activity likewise had no bearing
on the question whether any amount had as yet been lost, or otherwise was an
appropriate current deduction or credit.
At risk standards, although important in determining the maxi-
mum amount that is subject to being lost, were viewed as not a suffi-
cient basis for determining whether or when net losses from an activity
should be deductible against other sources of income, or for determin-
ing whether an ultimate economic loss had been realized. Congress
concluded that its goal of making tax preferences available principally
to active participants in substantial businesses, rather than to investors
seeking to shelter unrelated income, was best accomplished by examin-
ing material participation, as opposed to the financial stake provided by
an investor to purchase tax shelter benefits.
Id. (emphasis added). An appended footnote stated:
The at risk rules of prior law, while important and useful in preventing
overvaluation of assets, and in preventing the transfer of tax benefits to
taxpayers with no real equity in an activity, were viewed as not address-
ing the adverse consequences arising specifically from such transfers to
nonparticipating investors.
Id. at 213 n.7.
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Section 183 disallows a net loss from any activity which was formed
and operated without the requisite economic profit objective. That sec-
tion relies upon a subjective analysis of the entity's 60 nontax economic
profit motive, and it focuses scrutiny at the entity level for determining
whether the entity was formed with an economic profit motive. There-
fore, under section 183 a tax shelter is any entity formed with tax bene-
fits as its primary purpose.
By 1986 the "activity engaged in for profit" standard, as used in
both sections 165(c)(2) and 183, had developed into an effective weapon
against tax shelters. 6 1 Where successfully applied, an activity's net
losses and/or deductions are completely disallowed, a much harsher
consequence than section 469's suspension. 62 Given the Service's suc-
cess with section 183,63 one wonders why Congress did not, as an alter-
native to section 469, codify the rationale of those cases which had
expanded the reach of section 183.64 The answer may lie in the funda-
60. See I.R.C. § 183 (West Supp. 1989). Application of § 183's profit-mo-
tive criteria at the activity level served to diminish the impact the statute had
when applied to each individual investor. See Ronnen v. Commissioner, 90 T.C.
74, 91 (1988) ("Essential [to the application of § 183] is a demonstration that
[the entity] had an 'actual and honest objective of making a profit.' ") (citation
omitted). For an extensive discussion of the level at which profit motive is to be
determined, see Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471, 501-05 (1982), aff'd,
722 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1984).
61. See Smith v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 350, 394-95 (1982) (finding "that
the [taxpayers] lacked the requisite economic profit objective necessary to en-
able them to deduct their commodity tax straddle losses [under § 165(c)(2)'s
transaction entered into for profit standard]"), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir.
1987); see also Brannen, 78 T.C. at 512-13 (tax court made controversial extension
of § 183's "activities not engaged in for profit" test for a non-hobby activity-a
movie distribution limited partnership). For expanded coverage of the develop-
ments under § 183 in the tax shelter area, see Detailed Analysis, Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
No. 241-4th, at A-I1 to A-13 (1989).
62. Section 469(b) provides an unlimited carryover for suspended passive
losses. These losses have three possible means for release: first, they are avail-
able to offset the originating activity's future net active or passive income, but
not investment income (§ 469(f)(l)(A)); second, they may offset the taxpayer's
future aggregate net positive passive income (§ 469(0(l)(C)); and finally, upon
disposition of the taxpayer's entire interest in the respective activity, the passive
loss is released and applied against any class of income (§ 469(g)). I.R.C. § 469
(West Supp. 1989).
63. For examples of the successful application of § 183 to tax shelters dur-
ing 1986, see Powell v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 163 (1986) (marketing
license for oscillating toothbrush did not involve profit objective); Goldstein v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 9 (1986) (disallowing loss from Amway distrib-
utorship where minimal amount of time devoted to enterprise by taxpayers was
significant factor in court's decision); Finoli v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 697
(1986) (holding limited partnership formed to acquire and exploit community
antenna television (CATV) system lacked requisite profit objective under § 183).
But see Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471 (1986) (computer leasing enter-
prise found to be activity engaged in for profit).
64. As of 1986, a debate existed as to whether § 183 required a dominant
economic (non-tax) profit motivation, or whether entering into the venture with
merely a bonafide (as distinguished reasonable) profit objective was sufficient. See,
1174 [Vol. 34: p. 1163
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 6 [1989], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/4
1989] COMMENT 1175
mental differences in approach taken by sections 183 and 469 to the tax
shelter issue. 6
5
Section 183's profit-motive criteria is applied against the activity's
characteristics, and this single determination controls the activity's char-
acterization for all investors. In contrast, section 469's taxpayer-level
operation requires that a separate, and sometimes independent, analysis
be made of each investor. 6 6 Therefore, it is possible, and quite likely,
for an activity to be passive with respect to one investor and active with
respect to another. The investor's relation to the activity is the sole cri-
e.g., Jaros v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 548 (1985); Lemmen v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 1326, 1339-47 (1981); Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759,
784-88 (1981); see also Johnson v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 17, 26 (1986).
In a recent interpretation of § 183, the Tax Court held that the entity need
not have a reasonable expectation of profit, but must merely possess a bonafide
profit objective. Ronnen, 90 T.C. at 92 (rejecting Service's tax shelter claim
against S Corporation formed to purchase and market computer software within
nursing home industry).
65. A codified standard requiring a dominant or primary economic profit
motive would have attacked the primary deficiencies listed as the impetus for
adoption of the material participation standard. Congress intended the material
participation standard to ensure that an "investor [would] approach the activity
with a significant non-tax economic profit motive, and . . . form a sound judg-
ment as to whether the activity had genuine economic significance and value."
1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 212. Specifically, Congress' intended target
was "the more passive investor" who viewed tax benefits as the primary compo-
nent of return on capital. Id. Moreover, Congress targeted not only tax-moti-
vated investors, but also taxpayers whose involvement in an enterprise did not
represent "an ongoing source of [their] livelihood." Id. The gentleman farmer
was often singled out as a primary example of congressional motivation for the
passive loss provisions:
In some cases, the availability of tax preferences to nonparticipat-
ing investors was viewed as harmful to the industries that the prefer-
ences were intended to benefit. For example, in the case of farming,
credits and favorable deductions often encouraged investments by wealthy indi-
viduals whose principal or only interest in farming was to receive an investment
return, largely in the form of tax benefits to offset tax on positive sources of income.
Since such investors often did not need a positive cash return from
farming in order to profit from their investments, they had a substantial
competitive advantage in relation to active farmers, who commonly
were not in a position to use excess tax benefits to shelter unrelated
income. This significantly contributed to the serious economic difficul-
ties being experienced by many active farmers.
Id. at 211-12 (emphasis added).
It is apparent that § 183, even in an expanded form, would not possess
§ 469's scope of application. This distinction stems from the functional differ-
ence in each section's implicit definition of a tax shelter. While § 183 defines a
tax shelter as any activity entered into without a bona fide profit objective (or
references to bona fide profit, see supra note 65), § 469 classifies a tax shelter as
any passive vehicle which generates any tax benefits. See 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra
note 19, at 212.
66. Under § 469 an activity may be composed of both material and non-
material participants (by reason of its taxpayer-level analysis), whereas a charac-
terization under § 183 effects a uniform result on all the activity's investors. See
I.R.C. §§ 469, 183 (West Supp. 1989).
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terion, rather than the characteristics possessed by the activity itself, so
long as the activity constitutes a trade or business other than a rental
activity. This taxpayer-level analysis serves to intensify section 469's im-
pact upon tax-motivated investors. In contrast, section 183's impact was
diminished when the profit-objective analysis was restricted to the entity
level. An entity level analysis allows taxpayers without a profit objective
to skirt section 183 on the coattails of profit-motivated investors.
Beyond these operational distinctions, the substantive nature of
section 469's material participation requirement imposes a far heavier
burden on the taxpayer than section 183's profit-motive criteria. As ex-
plained below, section 469 is an additional hurdle that the taxpayer must
clear. Further, while the exact criteria used to determine material partic-
ipation is under debate, 6 7 even the most relaxed interpretation of the
three material participation criteria (regular, continuous and substan-
tial) would impose a greater evidentiary burden than that required to
demonstrate a non-tax profit motive.
These substantive and operational differences make section 469 a
far more effective weapon against tax shelters than section 183. How-
ever, as discussed earlier, this improved weapon relies upon a far more
expansive definition of a tax shelter.68 Congress, in attempting to iso-
late bona fide participants in an activity, has created a statute with a po-
tential application far beyond the rich individuals who invest in
traditional tax shelters. 6 9 The passive loss rules attack not only the gen-
tleman farmer for whom Congress expressed concern,70 but also have
67. For a discussion of material participation, see infra notes 150-64 and
accompanying text.
68. For further discussion of the definition of tax shelter, see supra note 41
and accompanying text.
69. "Traditional" tax shelter industries include: motion picture production
or distribution ventures; real estate (a very popular form of tax shelter prior to
the 1986 Act's specific assault upon the unique benefits produced by real estate);
farming ventures (also an extremely popular pre-1986 Act tax shelter vehicle-
the Senate Finance Committee Report specifically attacks a check-a-box, cattle-
feeding activity); coal tax shelters; shelters engaging in commodity options and
futures activity; equipment leasing shelters; research and development shelters;
and energy tax shelters. TAX SHELTERS-EXAMINATION HANDBOOK (I.R.S.)
(1985), reprinted in [1989 Index] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 41, 302, at
8836. Congress specifically exempted working interests in oil and gas proper-
ties from the passive activity rules. See I.R.C. § 469(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
70. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,529 (July 16, 1986). That General Counsel
Memorandum was interpreting pre-1986 Act law. The specific issue addressed
was "[w]hether interest incurred to purchase S Corporation stock [was] invest-
ment interest subject to the investment interest deduction limitation, where
under section 163(d) of the Code, the S Corporation held no investment assets
and the purchasers were employees of the S Corporation actively involved in its
management."
The Service concluded that there was no basis to distinguish between the
acquisition of C Corporation stock and S Corporation stock. Finding no basis
for differentiation, the Service fell back to the well-settled position that a busi-
ness interest is a capital assset held for investment purposes, and therefore the
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the potential to hinder numerous legitimate non-tax-orientated activi-
ties-section 469's most ominous impact lies in those areas never before
perceived as tax shelters.
IV. INTEGRATION OF SECTION 469 WITH OTHER CODE PROVISIONS
While this Comment's primary focus is not section 469's integration
with other code provisions, integration issues can be helpful in identify-
ing the statute's scope, as well as raising questions of legislative intent.
A. The Investment Interest Limitation Rules of Section 163
The most significant impact of section 469, with respect to section
163, is its effect on the characterization of interest payments made on
indebtedness incurred to acquire an interest in a pass-thru entity. Prior
to the 1986-Act there was no distinction between interest payments re-
lated to acquisition indebtedness of an interest in a pass-thru entity, as
opposed to an interest in sub-chapter "C" corporation. 7'
The addition of section 469 to the Code required modification to
the definition of investment interest. Section 469(e)(1)(A) of the Code
now requires that interest expense related to an activity's portfolio in-
vestments be segregated, and not taken into account, in determining the
activity's trade or business income. Accordingly, since section
469(e)(1)(A) has already identified the portfolio (investment) related in-
terest, section 163(d)(3)(B) of the Code was added to provide that the
term "investment interest" shall not include any interest expense taken
into account under section 469 in computing the trade or business in-
come of an activity. The Service has stated that yet to be issued tempo-
rary regulations will provide generally that interest expense will be
allocated in accordance with how the proceeds from the underlying in-
debtedness are utilized.7 2 Indebtedness related to the acquisition of an
interest in a pass-thru entity is no longer simply attributed to the equity
interest. Interest expense related to the acquisition of a pass-thru entity
will be deductible as a trade or business expense to the extent the un-
derlying assets are utilized in a trade or business activity in which the
taxpayer materially participates.
interest related to such an asset would be investment interest subject to the in-
vestment interest limitation rules contained in section 163(d).
71. Section 469(l)(4) of the Code provides that the Secretary shall pre-
scribe regulations which provide for the determination of the allocation of inter-
est expense for purposes of section 469. While these regulations are still
pending, the Service has announced that "the temporary regulations will pro-
vide that, for purposes of sections 163(d), 163(h), and 469 of the Code, interest
expense (other than qualified residence interest) generally is allocated on the
basis of the use of the proceeds of the underlying debt." 1987-3 I.R.B. 17.
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B. Section 183
As previously stated, section 469 imposes an additional hurdle to
the section 183 profit-motive requirement. Thus, while a taxpayer's par-
ticipation level is important, a material participant is not presumed to
possess the requisite profit objective required by section 183. 73 Any net
loss from an activity, whether currently allowable or suspended, will be
completely disallowed unless the activity possessed the requisite non-tax
economic profit objective. Section 469, therefore, does not preempt
section 183, but is complementary thereto.
The most troublesome example of section 183's application to pas-
sive losses would be where the taxpayer accrues passive losses for sev-
eral years, disposes of his entire interest, but is precluded from using
those losses by reason of an audit determination that section 183 ap-
plied to the originating loss years (i.e., due to the application of section
183, the loss carryforward would be disallowed because there was no
valid loss for section 469 to disallow and carryforward).
C. The Statute of Limitations
An important question unanswered by the above example is how far
back can an audit reach-is the taxpayer's exposure limited to the last
three years, or is the validity of the entire loss carryforward subject to
review?
Section 469(b) provides for an unlimited carryover of a disallowed
passive loss. Where a taxpayer has an activity which is a consistent pas-
sive loss generator, these losses will remain suspended, absent passive
activity income from some other source, until the disposal of the tax-
payer's entire interest in the activity.7 4 This unlimited carryforward
causes the original loss year to remain open with respect to an activity's
items of passive income and deductions. 7 5 That is, the original loss year
is closed for purposes of a deficiency assement; however, the Service
could recompute carry-over items which are being carried forward to an
open year (i.e., a year on which the limitations period has not run).
While the effect of section 469(b)'s unlimited carryover provision
on section 6501 (a)'s three-year assessment period has yet to be officially
addressed, the above conclusion can be supported by reference to inter-
pretations of section 17276 in analogous circumstances. In a recent rev-
enue ruling the Service stated, "[i]n determining the amount of a net
operating loss that may be carried from a closed year forward to an open
73. See, e.g., Detailed Analysis, supra note 61, at A-II to A-13.
74. I.R.C. § 4 6 9 (g)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
75. For example, the Service may challenge a passive loss carryforward
claimed in the year of disposition (1995) on the grounds that in the original loss
years (1987-1990) § 183 foreclosed any net deduction whatsoever.
76. Section 172 governs net operating loss (NOL) deductions. I.R.C. § 172
(West Supp. 1989).
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year ... all adjustments to taxable income, whether or not barred by the
statute of limitations, will be [subject to review]." ' 77 In light of the tax-
payer's burden of proof,78 this potential unlimited review imposes a
heavy record retention requirement on the taxpayer.
D. The At Risk Rules (§ 465) and Basis Limitations on Losses of a Partner
(§ 704(d)) or S Corporation Shareholder (§ 1366(d))
When determining a taxpayer's passive losses under section 469,
the at risk and basis limitation rules are calculated prior to any passive
loss classification. 79 Therefore, a passive loss will reduce a taxpayer's
basis and amount at risk in an activity, even if these otherwise permissi-
ble losses are suspended by the passive loss provisions.8 "
E. Tiered Structure Integration
Although this analysis of the interplay between section 469 and the
Code's other tax shelter provisions is not yet complete, a graphic sum-
mary at this point will illustrate the previous discussion and highlight the
subsequent material:
77. Rev. Rul. 81-88, 1981-1 C.B. 585, 587.
78. See I.R.C. § 7422(e) (West 1989).
79. The legislative history specifically states:
The determination of whether a loss is suspended under the pas-
sive loss rule is made after the application of the at-risk rules. A loss that
would not be allowed for the year because the taxpayer is not at risk
with respect to it is suspended under the at-risk provision, not the pas-
sive loss rule. Such amounts may become subject to the passive loss
rule in subsequent years when they would be allowable under the at-
risk rule. [An appended footnote stated:]
Amounts at risk are reduced even if deductions which would be
allowed under the at-risk rules are suspended under the passive
loss rule. Similarly, basis is reduced as under present law, even in the case
where deductions are suspended under the passive loss rule. However, if an
amount at risk or basis has been reduced by a deduction not al-
lowed under the passive loss rule, the amount at risk or basis is not
again reduced when the deduction becomes allowable under the
passive loss rule.
1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 223 & n.17 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 223.
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The ordering of tiers four and five of the diagram is based upon the
legislative history and the specific language of section 469(g)(1)(C) as
enacted by the 1986 Act. 8 ' The regulations reverse tiers four and five
and have the capital loss limitations applied after the passive loss limita-
tions. The Service's position appears to have been incorporated by ref-
erence into changes made by the 1988 Act. However, neither the 1988
Act, nor its legislative history, indicates a specific intent to reverse the
1986 Act's ordering. The argument against the regulations is weakened
by the 1988 Act's change to the statute.8 2
The Code's tiered structure provides a taxpayer with an opportu-
nity to control when the loss falls to the passive loss level. Therefore,
the loss item's character may be controlled to the extent a taxpayer can
circumvent the recharacterization regulations8 3 and change his status
from passive to active, or vice versa.
For example, assume a taxpayer whose only passive activity is an
investment as sole shareholder in an S Corporation. The S Corporation
is expected to have a $30,000 loss in the current year, and do no better
than break-even in the future. Due to the prior years' losses, the tax-
payer's basis in the stock of the S Corporation has been reduced to zero,
and his debt basis stands at $40,000, which is also the principal balance
on such indebtedness. Under this capital structure, the $30,000 current
year loss would be allowed by the at risk and basis limitation rules, but
suspended by section 469. Given an earnings forecast of no better than
break-even, the suspended loss would not be utilized until the taxpayer
disposed of his entire interest. The result would remain unchanged
even if the taxpayer were successful in obtaining an active status in sub-
sequent years. This is due to section 469(f)(1)(C), which provides that
once a loss is tainted as passive it remains passive, irrespective of any
subsequent change in the taxpayer's status.
However, the regulations, in combination with the at risk or basis
limitation rules, provide a means to circumvent section 469(f)(1)(C).
Treasury Regulation section 1.469-2T(d)(8) provides that passive or ac-
tive characterization under section 469 does not occur until such time as
the loss would have been otherwise deductible without regard to the
81. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 227-28. Section 469(g)(1)(C), as
passed by the 1986 Act, read as follows: "In the case of any loss realized on the
disposition of an interest in a passive activity, section 1211 shall be applied
before subparagraph (A) is applied." 1986 Act, supra note 1, § 501 (amended
1988). Public Law Number 100-647, § 1005(a)(2)(B) amended § 469(9)(1)(C)
of the Code to read as follows: "To the extent provided in regulations, income
or gain from the activity for preceding taxable years shall be taken into account
under subparagraph (A)(ii) for the taxable year to the extent necessary to pre-
vent the avoidance of this section."
82. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 85-90 and accom-
panying text.
83. For a discussion of the recharacterization regulations, see infra notes
107-32 and accompanying text.
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operation of sections 469, 613A(d) and 1211. Therefore, the taxpayer
in the above example could utilize the $30,000 loss, prior to the disposi-
tion of his entire interest, if he could trap the loss above the passive loss
tier and release it in a year in which his status had turned active.
The trap-and-release could be effected through manipulation of the
basis limitation rules. For example, in the above hypothetical the S Cor-
poration could repay the $40,000 loan prior to year end, reduce the tax-
payer's debt basis to zero, and the loss would be suspended and carried
forward indefinitely by operation of section 1366(d). 84 The taxpayer
could release the suspended loss through a capital contribution in a year
in which the taxpayer obtained active status. Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.469-2T(d)(8) would require classification in the release year,
which would allow the taxpayer to claim an active loss deduction in that
year. However, practical limitations always must be considered. For in-
stance, can the S Corporation afford to repay the loan? Where the S
Corporation cannot afford to repay the loan, could the loan be replaced
shortly after each year end's repayment without creating a sham transac-
tion? Will the recharacterization regulations prevent the taxpayer from
changing his status?
F. Capital Loss Limitation (§ 1211)
The legislative history to the 1986 Act specifically sets forth that
"[t]he limitation on the deductibility of capital losses is applied before the
determination of the amount of losses allowable upon the disposition
under the passive loss rule.''85 However, the regulations appear to ap-
ply the passive loss provisions prior to the capital loss limitation
calculation .86
84. This result is predicated on the shareholder having a basis in the in-
debtedness equal to the principal amount of such indebtedness. Note that if the
shareholder's basis in the indebtedness had been reduced below its principal
balance, then the S Corporation's repayment of the principal would cause the
lender/shareholder to recognize income on such repayment equal of the repay-
ment multiplied by a fraction-with the numerator being the basis reduction
that has occurred on the indebtedness, and the denominator, the principal bal-
ance of such indebtedness. See Abramson & Eberhardt, A Practical Approach to the
Successful Capitalization of an S Corporation, J. TAX'N OF S CORPORATIONS 16, 16-17
(Summer 1989). Therefore, if in the above example the indebtedness was re-
paid in the following year (i.e., after the $30,000 loss had reduced the share-
holder's basis in the indebtedness to $10,000), a $10,000 repayment would
cause the lender/shareholder to recognize $7,500 income.
85. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 227-28.
86. The temporary regulation reverses the statutory order of application as
follows:
(2) A passive activity deduction that is not disallowed for the tax-
able year under section 469 and the regulations thereunder may none-
theless be disallowed for the taxable year under section 1211. The
following example illustrates the application of this paragraph (d)(2):
Example. In 1987, an individual derives $10,000 of ordinary in-
come from passive activity X, no gains from the sale or exchange of
1989] COMMENT 1183
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The difference between these two positions can be exemplified as
follows. Assume an individual investor in a limited partnership, pan-
icked by the crash of 1987, sells one-half of his interest for a $20,000
capital loss. Despite realizing the loss, section 4 69(g) defers recognition
until disposition of the "entire interest" in the activity. The remaining
interest is sold in 1991 for a gain of $3,000. The taxpayer has no other
passive or capital transactions in 1991. Under Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.469-1T(d)(2), the taxpayer would recognize a $3,000 capital loss,
with the remaining $14,00087 carried over under section 1212. The reg-
ulation's application of section 469 prior to section 1211 denies the tax-
payer the benefit of section 121 l(b)'s $3,000 annual allowance for the
intervening years, 1987 through 1990. Therefore, under the regula-
tion's approach and assuming the taxpayer had no capital transactions in
the subsequent years, the remaining $14,000 would not be fully recog-
nized until 1996 (i.e., $3,000 per year X 5 years).
In the alternative, if the capital loss provisions are applied prior to
section 469, the capital loss to be recognized in 1991 should be com-
puted with reference to what would have been allowed under section
1211 in the intervening years (i.e., 1987-1990) without regard to section
4 69(g). Under the ordering described by the legislative history, the tax-
payer would be entitled to a $15,000 capital loss deduction in 1991, as-
suming no capital transactions in the intervening years. The deduction
would be composed of the current (1991) year's $3,000 section 1211 (b)
deduction, plus any section 1211 (b) deduction which would have been
allowed in each of the four intervening years without regard to section
469(g). Further, this amount would be increased by any capital gain rec-
ognized in the intervening years, and reduced to the extent the $3,000
section 1211 (b) deduction was otherwise utilized during those years.
Prior to the 1988 Act, section 469(g)(1)(C) referred to realized
losses. The term realized refers to a transaction's economic conse-
capital assets or assets used in a trade or business, $12,000 of capital
loss from passive activity Y, and no income, gain, deductions, or losses
from any other passive activity. The capital loss from activity Y is a
passive activity deduction (within the meaning of § 1.469-2T(d)).
Under section 469 and the regulations thereunder, the taxpayer is al-
lowed $10,000 of the $12,000 passive activity deduction and has a
$2,000 passive activity loss for the taxable year. Since the $10,000 pas-
sive activity deduction allowed under section 469 is a capital loss, such
deduction is allowable for the taxable year only to the extent provided
under section 1211. Therefore, the taxpayer is allowed $3,000 of the
$10,000 capital loss under section 1211 and has a $7,000 capital loss
carryover (within the meaning of section 1212(b)) to the succeeding
taxable year.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(d)(2) (1988); see also Passive Loss Rules, Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) No. 454, at A-43 (1988) (interpreting above regulation as requiring
§ 1211's capital loss limitation to be applied after application of passive loss
provisions).
87. The $20,000 loss reduced by the $3,000 capital gain and $3,000
§ 1211 (b) allowance.
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quences. 88 Recognized refers to whether the realized transaction will be
allowed to be reflected in the calculation of the taxpayer's taxable in-
come. 89 The pre-1988 Act section 469(g)(l)(C)'s explicit reference to a
realized loss, combined with its directive to apply section 1211 prior to
section 469, gave substance to the position that the section 1211 limita-
tion was to be calculated, and given effect, in the year of economic reali-
zation-with any allowable benefits passed down to the passive loss tier,
which would suspend the loss until it could be recognized under section
469(g)(1).
As discussed above, the 1988 Act amended section 469(g)(1)(C),
deleting its specific directive for the application of section 1211 prior to
section 469. The 1988 Act change weakens the proposed alternative po-
sition to the regulation's integration of sections 1211 and 469. How-
ever, the alternative position still retains support from the 1986 Act's
legislative history and the statute's overall purpose.90
While the above circumstances will not be faced by numerous tax-
payers, it nonetheless should be an issue that will receive some attention
in the near future since recognition of any loss in excess of $3,000 will
trigger an immediate inquiry by the Service. Any taxpayer adopting this
alternative position to the regulations should anticipate a challenge and
ensure that the potential benefit outweighs the expected costs of litiga-
tion. Further, given the lack of authority on this point, a taxpayer adopt-
ing this position would be well advised to disclose his position on his
return to avoid any substantial understatement penalty.
V. ISSUES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RAISED BY THE REGULATIONS
The preceding section discussed issues pertaining to section 469's
integration with the Code's other tax shelter provisions. While relevant,
those issues pale in significance to the impact made by the material par-
ticipation and recharacterization regulations. The statute's broad dele-
gation of power to the Secretary of the Treasury over these areas9
allows the regulations 92 to redefine section 469's impact. How the Sec-
retary has exercised this power will be this Comment's remaining focus.
88. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1988); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137
(5th ed. 1979).
89. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1143 (5th ed. 1979).
90. Section 469's purpose is to defer recognition of an activity's tax benefits
until such time as the actual economic loss can be determined (i.e., upon the
taxpayer's disposition of his entire interest in the activity). However, the regula-
tion's position defers recognition of a suspended passive capital loss well be-
yond the year of disposition. By contrast, the alternative position is consistent
with the statute's intent. This approach accrues each year's unused capital loss
limitation that would have been available to the taxpayer, but for section 469.
1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 213.
91. See I.R.C. § 469(l)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
92. T.D. 8175, 53 Fed. Reg. 5686 (1988).
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A. Establishing Material Participation Under the Regulations
The regulations have constructed seven alternatives by which a tax-
payer may establish material participation status. The first six are
mechanical tests which if met require the taxpayer to be treated as a
material participant in an activity. The seventh is a catch-all facts-and-
circumstances alternative. These criteria are:
(a) [A]n individual shall be treated, for purposes of section
469 and the regulations thereunder, as materially participating
in an activity for the taxable year if and only if-
(1) The individual participates in the activity for more than
500 hours during such year;
(2) The individual's participation in the activity for the taxa-
ble year constitutes substantially all of the participation in such
activity of all individuals (including individuals who are not
owners of interests in the activity) for such year;
(3) The individual participates in the activity for more than
100 hours during the taxable year, and such individual's partici-
pation in the activity for the taxable year is not less than the
participation in the activity of any other individual (including
individuals who are not owners of interest in the activity) for
such year;
(4) The activity is a significant participation activity (within
the meaning of paragraph (c) of this section) for the taxable
year, and the individual's aggregate participation in all signifi-
cant participation activities during such year exceeds 500
hours;
(5) The individual materially participated in the activity (de-
termined without regard to this paragraph (a)(5)) for any five
taxable years (whether or not consecutive) during the 10 taxa-
ble years that immediately precede the taxable year;
(6) The activity is a personal service activity (within the mean-
ing of paragraph (b) of this section), and the individual materi-
ally participated in the activity for any 3 taxable years (whether
or not consecutive) preceding the taxable year; or
(7) Based on all the facts and circumstances (taking into ac-
count rules and paragraph (b) of this section), the individual
participates in the activity on a regular continuous and substan-
tial basis during such years.93
The first three alternatives represent a pure quantitative measure-
ment of material participation. The fourth test provides for what ap-
pears to be a quite favorable result, but one which is turned on its head
by the recharacterization regulations. Finally, the Service provides a
"facts-and-circumstances" test (the seventh alternative), which is
93. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) (1988).
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designed as a backstop to the first four quantitative provisions. To-
gether, these five alternatives comprise the material participation regula-
tion's primary operational provisions. The remaining fifth and sixth
alternatives are anti-abuse provisions, designed to thwart passive in-
come characterization where historic participation in the activity does
not warrant that classification.
In general, a regulation's primary function is to provide taxpayers
with guidance on compliance with ambiguous statutory provisions. It is
through these rules and standards that the Secretary exercises his inter-
pretative powers. Therefore, an examination of the regulations in an
application format provides the best context for illuminating specific in-
terpretative positions of the Secretary.
1. The More Than 500 Hours Test
The over 500 hours criteria raises few questions other than inter-
pretative issues over the quantitative approach and scope of activities to
be included in participation.9 4
2. The Substantially All Test
The "substantially all activity required" alternative appears to be
addressed to a one-man operation scenario. For example, an individual
who devotes eighty hours a year running an automotive repair shop out
of his garage, and who is the only individual engaged in that activity, will
be deemed to have materially participated without regard to total time
spent.9 5
Important to this example, as well as to the entire concept of mate-
rial participation, is the fact that an agent's or employee's participation
(other than a spouse)96 cannot be attributed to the taxpayer.9 7 There-
fore, in the above example, if business picked up and the taxpayer in-
creased his participation to ninety hours, and engaged his son to
contribute forty additional hours, the taxpayer would not be deemed a
material participant because the taxpayer's activity was not substantially
all of the participation required (alternative two), and did not exceed
100 hours (the minimum hourly participation required under alternative
three).9 8 Query: Has the regular, continuous and substantial nature of
94. For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 150-64 and accompany-
ing text.
95* Lipton, supra note 5, at 241.
96. Section 469(h)(5) allows spouses' involvement in an activity to be ag-
gregated for purposes of determining material participation. I.R.C. § 469(h)(5)
(West Supp. 1989).
97. 1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 735.
98. For further discussion of the issue, see PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra
note 5, at 63 example a. The example provides:
Sam sells automobiles. He decides to start a company converting
mini-vans into campers. Initially, he spends his Sundays doing camper
conversions, but later the demand outstrips his ability to convert vans
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the father's activity changed?
3. The Most Active Participant Test
Alternatively, changing the taxpayer's participation in the above ex-
ample to 150 hours illustrates compliance with the regulations' third al-
ternative requiring that no one was a more active participant, and the
taxpayer participated a minimum of 100 hours. This regulation's practi-
cal effect is to limit low hourly participation activities to one material
participant.
For example, partners A and B operate a Sunday newspaper stand
at a loss due to their having bid too high for the local church's conces-
sions. Neither A's nor B's participation in the activity exceeds 500
hours, and this is the only activity in which either is engaged. In order
for each partner to be a material participant (under alternative three),
each partner must participate no more or no less than the other. 99
Therefore, if A missed two weeks of work because of illness, the regula-
tions would deny him material participant status. The rule's inequity
becomes obvious: Why does 45% participation lack materiality in the
case of two otherwise equal partners, while 33% participation would
have satisfied the requirement if A and B had hired an employee and
split the workload evenly?
Where an activity requires less than 500 man-hours of participation,
the regulations operate to allow only one material participant.' 0 0 How-
ever, neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history im-
plies that low hourly participation activities permit only one material
participant. The statute gives no indication that its "regular... continu-
ous, and ... substantial" criteria are to be determined with regard to any
other party's level of participation.'10 Further, "majority" or "most," as
required by the regulations, are not synonymous with "substantial."
"Substantial" should carry the same relative meaning to all activities,
regardless of the total number of hours involved.
The regulations' third alternative should, therefore, be modified to
recognize that an activity not requiring a substantial hourly commitment
can, nevertheless, have more than one material participant. If the Ser-
vice retains a quantitative test, it should shift its emphasis from an
on Sundays. He brings his son into the business to work full-time. Sam
continues to make all the major decisions and invests all of his own
capital. The fact that Sam is only available to work on Sundays and an
occasional evening and his son works more hours should not result in
Sam having a passive activity.
Id.
99. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(k) example 3 (1988).
100. Alternative three will allow more than one material participant only
where identical levels of participation are present. Id. As a planning matter this
is not a viable option for an activity with two or more individuals who are in fact
material participants.
101. I.R.C. § 469(h)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
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hourly measurement to a stated minimum percentage participation rela-
tive to the activity's total required participation. 10 2 Further, as sug-
gested by the above newspaper stand hypothetical, the regulations
should adopt some relief measure for those whose participation levels
are diminished by a temporary, but nonetheless lengthy, disability.
4. Significant Participation Activities
The regulations' fourth route to establishing material participation
introduces the non-statutory concept of a significant participation activ-
ity (SPA). An SPA is defined as a trade or business activity in which the
taxpayer significantly participates, but does not materially participate. ' 0 3
Significant participation is activity exceeding 100 hours. 10 4 Where a
taxpayer has multiple SPAs and his aggregate participation in all his
SPAs exceeds 500 hours, the regulations deem him to be a material par-
ticipant with respect to each SPA.' 0 5
The SPA regulations can be exemplified as follows. Recall A and B
who ran the Sunday newspaper stand. A, due to illness, participated
only 300 hours as compared to B's 375. Under the regulations' third
alternative B was deemed to be the activity's only material participant.
But, under the SPA regulations, A is a significant participant. Since A is
not a material participant under any other rule, the activity is, therefore,
a significant participation activity with respect to A. 10 6
Where a taxpayer's total aggregate SPA participation exceeds 500
hours, the taxpayer will be deemed to have materially participated in all
his SPAs. Therefore, if A also contributes 400 hours to his auto repair
shop (which falls short of material participation because it is less than
500 hours, and the son's participation exceeds that contributed by the
taxpayer), then the taxpayer's total SPA participation would exceed 500
hours (300 + 400 = 700 hours), and he would be deemed to be a mate-
rial participant in both the newspaper stand and auto repair shop
activities.
5. Recharacterization
However, this sweet result can turn sour under the significant par-
ticipation recharacterization (SPR) regulations.' 0 7 The SPR regulations
require that otherwise passive income be recharacterized, as active income,
when the taxpayer's aggregate SPAs produce net positive income.
102. For a discussion of this issue, see PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra note
5, at 53. An example of such a provision would provide that any participant
involved at a level of activity greater than or equal to 75% of that activity's most
active participant shall be deemed a material participant in such activity.
103. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(c)(1) (1988).
104. Id. § 1.469-5T(c)(2).
105. Id. § 1.469-5T(a)(4).
106. See Lipton & Evaul, supra note 26, 505.44.
107. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2T(0(2) (1988).
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These recharacterization rules can be exemplified as follows. In
1989, the initial year of operation, A has net passive income of $5,000
from the newsstand and $10,000 from the auto repair shop. A's total
SPA participation was 350 hours (150 newsstand hours, and 200 repair
shop hours); therefore, under the SPA regulations, A is not a material
participant with respect to those activities. In addition, A has a passive
rental loss of $20,000 which does not qualify for the section 469(i) active
participation exception. Absent the SPR regulations, A's net passive in-
come would be zero because the net rental loss would shelter the passive
income from the other two activities. However, under the SPR regula-
tions, A's SPA passive income is recharacterized as active income due to
the fact that his net SPA income was positive. Thus, none of the SPA
income can be sheltered by the rental loss. 10 8
The SPR regulations also have a detrimental effect upon the availa-
bility of a net operating loss carryback. For example, assume a taxpayer
has only one SPA which generates $1,000,000 of income in the first year.
The recharacterization rules transform this otherwise passive income
into active income. The following year, the same SPA suffers a $500,000
passive loss which, because it is a net loss, is not subject to recharacter-
ization. The activity's economic operating results are distorted by the
SPR regulations because the change in the activity's year-to-year charac-
terization appears to bar the benefit of section 172, which would allow
the current year's loss to be matched against prior years' income.' 0 9 Re-
gardless of recharacterization, the $500,000 passive activity loss will be
available for use under the three alternatives described earlier.' 1
The SPA and SPR regulations represent a double-edged sword. In
one respect the SPA regulations' leniency undermines section 469's stat-
utory scheme. Evidence thereof is that support for this exception to the
statute's material participation requirement cannot be found in either
the statute or its legislative history. I'' Predictably, the SPA exception
will apply disproportionately to wealthy taxpayers, who are cited as sec-
tion 469's primary target. 1 2 This is because wealthy taxpayers are
more likely to have multiple non-materially participating business ven-
108. See Lipton & Evaul, supra note 26, 1004-13.
109. See PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 108.
110. See I.R.C. § 469(o (West Supp. 1989). This section allows an activity's
suspended PALs to offset its future active income. This presumably encom-
passes income which is active by reason of recharacterization. Thus, a taxpayer's
PAL-carryforward should be allowed to shelter the taxpayer's otherwise passive
activity income which is subject to recharacterization in any given year.
111. Some members of the A.B.A. Section on Taxation specifically stated
that "[i]n one respect, the SPA rules are far too lenient. The possibility that a
taxpayer could participate 101 hours in each of five different trade or business
activities and (without more) be deemed to materially participate in all of them
appears totally incongruous with a rigorous 'regular continuous and substantial'
standard." PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 53.
112. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 210.
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tures which would fall within the aggregation rules set forth under the
SPA regulations. The wealthy's propensity to fall within the SPA classifi-
cation appears to have been an intended, as opposed to inadvertent, re-
sult. This is because the SPA regulations were not motivated by the
statute, but are a tool contrived for the exclusive benefit of the SPR
regulations.
Together, the SPA and SPR regulations operate to prohibit passive
activity losses from sheltering passive activity income. However, the in-
ter-activity sheltering of passive income with passive losses was specifi-
cally contemplated by Congress when it stated that "[l]osses and credits
from a passive activity ... may be applied against income for the taxable
year from other passive activities or against income subsequently gener-
ated by any passive activity."' 13 Further, the statute reflects this intent
through section 469(d)(1), which defines passive activity loss as "the
amount ... by which-(A) the aggregate losses from all passive activities
for the taxable year, exceed (B) the aggregate income from all passive
activities for such year."'' 1
4
The need for recharacterization authority to prevent manipulation
was recognized by Congress, and the Secretary's regulations imply a rea-
sonable presumption that contrived passive income generators pose the
greatest threat to the statute's integrity. However, the SPA and SPR
regulations' response to this threat casts a much too broad and indis-
criminate net-one which goes far beyond congressional intent.
Congress intended the statute's anti-abuse authority to be targeted
only against taxpayers acting with an intent to circumvent the rules.' 15
This congressional limitation is expressed by the legislative history's ex-
ample which designates as its target "activit[ies] ... previous[ly] gener-
ating active business losses that the taxpayer intentionally seeks to treat as
passive at a time when they generate net income with the purpose of cir-
cumventing the rule."' 116 The SPR regulations exceed congressional in-
tent by triggering recharacterization based on nothing more than
positive aggregate SPA income.
6. An Abuse of Discretion?
While regulations are often the subject of valid criticism, few are
invalidated due to a presumption of correctness granted by most
courts.1 17 Despite their apparent overreaching, the SPR regulations are
likely to be upheld given their legislative nature' 1 8 and the statute's
113. Id. at 215.
114. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
115. 1986 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-147.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See Westin, supra note 40, at 16; see also Wolfman, Forward to Note-
Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1980 Term, 35 TAX LAWYER 443 (1980).
118. "Legislative Regulations" are issued pursuant to a Code section's spe-
cific grant of authority to define a statutory term or provide a method of execut-
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broad delegation of authority to the Secretary.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 19 stated
ing a statutory provision. See Westin, supra note 40, at 17; see also United States v.
Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982).
119. 455 U.S. 16 (1982). The question presented in Vogel was quite simple.
Under a graduated tax structure a corporation with $200,000 of taxable income
would have paid tax at a 46% marginal rate. But if the corporation were divided
into 10 separate corporate taxpaying entities, then taxable income for each
would be $20,000, and the marginal rate would be reduced to 15%. To thwart
this abuse of the graduated tax structure, Congress enacted § 1561(a), which
forces corporations under common control (i.e., "members of a controlled
group") to file as a single tax paying entity. See I.R.C. § 1561(a) (West Supp.
1989). Under § 1563 a controlled group of corporations could exist in two
forms: parent-subsidiary commonality (§ 1563(a)(1)); or a brother-sister com-
monality (§ 1563(a)(2)).
In Vogel, the Court interpreted the 80% prong of the brother-sister con-
trolled group definition. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 18. Under § 1563(a)(2) a brother-
sister controlled group exists "if five or fewer persons ... [possess] (A) at least
80% of the total [voting power or total value of the corporation], and (B) more
than 50% of the total combined voting power ... or more than 50% of the total
value of each corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of each such
person only to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such
corporation." I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
The Treasury had interpreted § 1563(a)(2)(A)'s 80% requirement to mean
that any of the five or fewer persons could satisfy the test by holding, singly or in
combination, the requisite 80%. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 19. The taxpayer, however,
took the position that only parties possessing an actual interest in each corpora-
tion would count towards the 80% threshold. Id. at 22-23. As demonstrated in
a footnote, the practical difference between these two positions can be best illus-
trated by the following example:
Corporations
Identical
Individuals U V W X Y Ownership
A 55% 51% 55% 55% 55% 51%
B 45% 49% .. .. .. .... (45%
in U & V)
C .. .. 45%
D .. .. .. 45%
E .. .. .. .. 457%
The parties would agree that the 50-percent identical-ownership
requirement in Part (B) [§ 1563(a)(2)(B)] is met for all corporations by
shareholder A's identical ownership of 51 percent of all of the corpora-
tions. The Commissioner would find the 80-percent requirement met
as well, and would therefore define all five corporations as part of a
controlled group, because various subgroups of the five or fewer share-
holders can account for 80 percent of each corporation. The Taxpayer's
position is that only corporations U and V are part of a brother-sister controlled
group, because they are the only two corporations in which precisely the same five or
fewer persons account for 80 percent of the stock of the putative "brother-sister
controlled" corporations.
Id. at 23 n.7 (emphasis added).
In addressing these conflicting positions, the Court first resolved the
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that deference to Treasury regulations will be accorded only where:
(1) the regulation's position falls within a reasonable interpretation of
the "four-corners" of the statute, 120 and (2) the interpretation chosen
"harmonizes with the statute's 'origin and purpose.' ,121
This analytical framework is nothing more than a reiteration of stat-
utory construction's fundamental rules. More indicative of the Court's
standard of review is the Vogel Court's statements that in order to be
invalidated "the regulation [must be] fundamentally at odds with the
manifest congressional design" of the statute; 12 2 and that legislative
regulations will be accorded greater deference than interpretative
regulations. 123
Vogel invalidated an interpretative regulation, which had been ac-
corded the lowest level of deference due to the specificity of the statu-
tory language which the regulation purported to interpret. 124 However,
despite ample evidence of congressional intent, the majority struggled
threshold issue of the amount of deference owed to the Commissioner's inter-
pretation. Id. at 24. The Court stated the well-settled policy that greater defer-
ence will be accorded to legislative regulations. Id. (regulations issued under the
Commissioner's general authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regula-
tions") (quoting I.R.C. § 7805(a)). The regulations under § 1563(a)(2) are in-
terpretative. Id. The degree of deference granted regulations is proportional to
the ambiguity of the statutory language the regulation purports to interpret. Id.
The deference granted Treasury Regulation § 1.1563-1 (a) (3) was circumscribed
by the considerable specificity with which the statute defined the term "brother-
sister controlled group."
Once the threshold issue of deference was resolved, the Court applied a
two-prong harmonizing analysis, looking first to the regulation's harmony with
statutory language, and secondly to the statute's origin and purpose. Id. at 25-
26. First, the Court reviewed each alternative's position in light of the "four-
corners" of the statute in order to determine if the statute was capable of more
than one reasonable interpretation. Id. at 25. The Court concluded that each
alternative was technically consistent with the statute's language and construc-
tion. Id. at 26. However, a regulation will not be sustained for mere technical
consistency with the statute when it is "fundamentally at odds with the manifest
congressional design." Id. at 26 (citing United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S.
546, 557 (1973)).
The legislative history was then examined to determine whether the regula-
tion harmonized with the statute's "origin and purpose." Id. (citing National
Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)). The legisla-
tive history revealed that "[t]he intended targets of I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) were
groups of interrelated corporations characterized by common control and owner-
ship." Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). The Court rejected the Commissioner's
interpretation, having concluded that "it [was] not the smallness of the number of
persons in each company that triggers § 1563; it is the sameness of that small
number." Id. at 30 (quoting T. L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532,
537 (8th Cir. 1977) (Webster, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).
120. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 25.
121. Id. at 26 (quoting National Muffler Dealers, 440 U.S. at 477).
122. Id. (citing Cartwright, 411 U.S. at 557).
123. Id. at 24.
124. Id.
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to invalidate this regulation which had been accorded a minimal level of
deference.
In contrast to the regulation in Vogel, the SPR regulations are legis-
lative in nature and, therefore, will be accorded a much higher level of
deference. While different terminology is employed by the courts for
review of legislative regulations, the difference amounts to mere seman-
tics. The substantive analytical framework parallels the Vogel Court's
traditional approach. 125 Hence, the level of deference granted is the
only substantive distinction between the Court's approach to legislative,
versus interpretative, regulations. In practice then, in order to invali-
date legislative regulations one must sustain a burden of "greater
weight" than when attempting to invalidate interpretative regula-
tions. 126 This "burden of greater weight" has been characterized as re-
quiring that the regulation either exceed the scope of the delegated
power, 127 contradict the statute, 12 8 or be an unreasonable interpreta-
tion of the statute.' 29
Using the Vogel analysis, section 469 empowers the Secretary to
recharacterize income (or gain) from passive to active, which is precisely
the operation of the SPR regulations. Thus, the SPR regulations are
technically consistent with the statute's language. However, the SPR
regulations conflict with the express congressional intent to allow shel-
tering among passive activities and to target anti-abuse recharacteriza-
tion authority only against those taxpayers whose participation has been
manipulated "with the [intent] of circumventing the rule[s].' 3 0 None-
theless, a court wishing to uphold the SPR regulations could expand
upon the legislative history's parenthetical preface to the aforemen-
tioned recharacterization examples, which emphasize the Secretary's
discretionary authority in this area.1 31 The Service has in fact taken this
position for justification of its recharacterization regulations.' 3 2 While
125. The Fifth Circuit has characterized the review of legislative regulations
as a three-pronged analysis examining whether the regulation was: (1) within
the statute's grant of authority; (2) issued pursuant to proper procedure; and
(3) reasonable. Kramertown Co. v. Commissioner, 488 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir.
1974). The U.S. Claims Court characterized the test as determining whether the
legislative regulation was "within the scope of authority vested in the Treasury
by the enabling act." Union Carbide Corp. v. United States, 612 F.2d 558, 563
(Ct. Cl. 1979). However phrased, the analytical framework involved analysis of
the statute, followed by a review of the consistency of the regulation with the
congressional intent for that statute.
126. Goldman v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 382, 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
127. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
128. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267 (1938).
129. Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., 32 T.C. 1222 (1959).
130. 1986 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-147 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Moriarty, Real Estate, Timber, and Other Industries Call for De-Emphasis of
Bright Line Passive Loss Rules, 40 TAx NOTES 10, 11 (1988). Gregory Marich, at-
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substantial criticisms of the SPR regulations exist, it is unlikely, given
the deference accorded legislative regulations, that these criticisms
would be so compelling as to satisfy the burden necessary to show the
regulations as contradictory, unreasonable or exceeding the scope of the
statute's delegated authority.
B. The Anti-Abuse Rules
The regulations' fifth and sixth alternatives are designed to combat
taxpayers' efforts to manipulate an activity's character by controlling any
single year's participation in that activity. As with the SPR regulations,
the anti-abuse rules' primary purpose is to prevent profitable material
participation activities from being manipulated into passive income gen-
erators (PIGs). However, instead of flip-flopping an activity's characteri-
zation based solely on its profitability, these rules characterize the
activity with reasonable presumptions based on historical experience.
1. The Five-Out-of-Ten Rule
This rule provides that a taxpayer will be deemed to have materially
participated in any activity for which he was a material participant for
any five taxable years (whether or not consecutive) during the ten taxa-
ble years preceding the current year. 133 The regulation serves as a rea-
sonable limitation against a taxpayer's year-to-year manipulation of
participation status.' 34 However, the following situations demonstrate
the need for some modification.
One case is that of a material participant who retires from a non-
personal service activity, but retains a financial interest. Suppose an
owner of an S Corporation decides to retire and to turn the operations
over to his son. If the owner retires at the end of 1989, the five-out-of-
ten rule will treat him as a material participant through 1994. In effect,
the rule recharacterizes the owner's status from passive to active for the
initial five post-retirement years.
As stated earlier, the congressional intent for recharacterization was
to thwart intentional manipulation of a taxpayer's participation status.
To the extent a taxpayer controls participation in any one year, the five-
out-of-ten rule's objective criteria contain a reasonable presumption of
manipulative intent. However, the regulation works an inequity where
imposed in circumstances void of any tax avoidance motivation, such as
in the case of the retiree, or an employee/owner, who terminates his
torney-advisor in Treasury's Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, responded to
criticisms of the recharacterization rules by contending "that the legislative in-
tent of § 469 [was] not merely to stop tax shelters, but to 'stop abuses relating to
passive losses.' " Id.
133. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(5) (1988).
134. Accord PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 56.
1989] 1195
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participation in order to pursue retirement or some other activity on a
full-time basis.
To equitably modify the rule it is suggested that the Service provide
for an election out of the regulation.' 3 5 The election could be in the
form of an agreement between the taxpayer and the Service that the
taxpayer will not materially participate in the activity for the next five
years, and that the taxpayer has an affirmative duty to inform the Service
of any change in status during that period. Further, the statute of limita-
tions could be extended for five years with respect to that activity.
Absent an election out, a retiring partner, or any partner who genu-
inely intends to terminate participation, could transform his interest
from that of a general to a limited partner, and secure the shelter of
section 469(h)(2), which presumes a limited partner as passive unless
recharacterized by the regulations. 136
However, the aggressive posture of the existing recharacterization
regulations indicates that such a maneuver probably would be chal-
lenged. The Service would probably rely on the unqualified language of
the statute. The taxpayer's counter-argument would focus on the exam-
ples for exercise of the Service's recharacterization power contained in
the legislative history:
For example, regulations may provide that, in order to pre-
vent avoidance of the passive loss rule, a limited partner's share
of income from a limited partnership is treated as not from a
passive activity. Circumstances in which such treatment could be ap-
propriate would include a transfer by a corporation of an income-
producing activity to a limited partnership with a distribution
to shareholders of limited partnership interests. The regula-
tions might also treat as not passive those activities that previ-
ously generated active business losses and that the taxpayer,
135. Rather than an election out, various members of the ABA's Section of
Taxation recommended that the mandatory treatment of the regulation be
changed to a rebuttable presumption, thereby incorporating some equitable
flexibility into the rule. Id. at 57. While both a rebuttable presumption and an
election out strive to incorporate a measure of equitable flexibility into the rule,
it is suggested that the election out better protects the Service's interests.
136. Section 469(h) (2) states: "Except as provided in regulations, no interest in
a limited partnership as a limited partner shall be treated as an interest with
respect to which a taxpayer materially participates." I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) (West
Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). As of the drafting of this article the recharacter-
ization regulations under this provision had not yet been issued. See PASSIVE
Loss TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 126.
One of a number of potential questions raised by such a transaction is
whether it would trigger recognition or be eligible for like-kind exchange treat-
ment under § 1031. A recent private letter ruling indicates that like-kind ex-
change treatment would be appropriate. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8912023 (Mar. 24,
1989). Therein, the Service ruled that § 1031 (a)(2)(D), which excludes partner-
ship interests from like-kind exchange treatment, was limited to exchanges of
interests in different partnerships.
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with the purpose of circumventing the passive loss rule, intention-
ally seeks to treat as passive at a time when they generate net
income. A further example of a situation where regulatory au-
thority might appropriately be exercised is the case of related
party leases or sub-leases, with respect to property used in a
business activity, that have the effect of reducing active busi-
ness income and creating passive income.13 7
These examples limit the appropriate circumstances for recharacteriza-
tion to instances where the character of the activity was dictated by a
completely tax-motivated change in the composition or structure of the
activity, and not where a change was effected to better reflect a former
participant's new legal and economic relationship to the activity. It is
unclear whether this argument would be sufficient authority to allow the
change over to a limited partnership interest to circumvent the five-out-
of-ten recharacterization regulation.
2. Retirement Payments Which Extend Beyond the Five-Year
Recharacterization Window
To this point it has been assumed that payments to a withdrawing
owner were either lump-sum or did not extend beyond Treasury Regu-
lation section 1.469-5T(c)(2)'s five-year recharacterization window.
However, where payments extend beyond five years, two questions
arise: (1) What are the payments' character after this five-year period?
and (2) What happens to the activity's suspended PALs where the entire
interest is disposed of under the installment method?
First, in the case of a non-personal service partnership, the regula-
tions employ a look-back provision for any section 736(a)(2) and (b) pay-
ments-which are generally any payments classified as other than a
distributive share under section 736(a)(1).138 Therefore, regardless of
when the payment is received, its characterization will be controlled by
the partner's status as of the time the liquidation of such partner's inter-
est commenced..
Second, where a taxpayer's entire interest is sold for a gain under
the installment method, section 4 69(g)(3) provides for ratable recogni-
tion of any suspended PAL over the installment period.' 3 9 Where the
interest is sold for a loss, section 453 will not apply and, therefore, the
entire suspended PAL can be recognized in the disposition year. 140
Despite these limitations, there are means available to structure re-
tirement payments as passive income generators. The above rules apply
only to a closed transaction (i.e., the look-back rules apply only when a
137. 1986 BLUE BooK, supra note 19, at 234-35 (emphasis added).
138. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2T(e)(2)(i)-(iii) (1988); see also Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2T(e)(2)(iii)(B).
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fixed payment structure is used). They are inapplicable to a transaction
which utilizes section 7 36(a)(1) distributive share payments. 141
Therefore, a withdrawing materially-participating partner who ac-
cepts a specified interest in the partnership's profits for a term of years
can avoid recharacterization under the aforementioned regulation
(although, absent successful conversion to a limited partnership interest,
the term must extend beyond Treasury Regulation section 1.469-
5T(c)(2)'s five-year taint before any passive income can be realized).
Under Treasury Regulation section 1.736-1 (b)(5)(ii), all payments under
this format are first allocated towards payment for the fair market value
of the partner's section 736(b) property, with subsequent payments clas-
sified as section 736(a)(1) payments. Therefore, in the ideal situation,
payment for the section 736(b) property will be stretched over five years,
with subsequent section 736(a) payments generating passive income. Of
course, the risk of assuming a contingent payment obligation must be
weighed against the retiring partner's need for passive activity
income. 142
3. Participation In a Personal Service Activity for Any Three Years
Where a taxpayer materially participated in a personal service activ-
ity 143 for any three preceding taxable years, whether or not consecutive,
he is thereafter forever deemed a material participant in that activity. 14 4
This rule carries a similar presumption of manipulative intent to that
found in the five-out-of-ten rule. However, the look-back period to any
three years, combined with a permanent taint, magnifies this rule's depar-
ture from the congressional design of the statute's recharacterization au-
thority. Neither the statute's specific provisions for the "[t]reatment of
141. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2T(c)(4)(i) (1988).
142. Payments structured as a distributive share under § 736(a)(1) are not
deductible by the partnership, while guaranteed payments under §§ 736(a)(2)
and 707(c) are deductible. See I.R.C. §§ 707(c), 736 (West 1988).
143. The Treasury Regulations define a "personal service activity" as
follows:
(d) An activity constitutes a personal service activity for purposes
of paragraph (a)(6) [regarding material participation] of this section if
such activity involves the performance of personal services in-
(A) The fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, account-
ing, actuarial science, performing arts, or counseling; or
(B) Any other trade or business in which capital is not a material
income producing factor.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(d) (1988); see also PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra
note 5, at 58-59 (criticizing regulation's expanded definition of personal service
activity as "likely to spawn significant litigation as taxpayers battle the Service
concerning whether or not capital was a material income producing factor in a
variety of businesses. This possibility of litigation is heightened by the particu-
larly harsh treatment for personal service activities under the perpetual taint rule
[of this regulation].").
144. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(6) (1988).
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certain retired individuals," 145 nor any of its references to personal ser-
vice corporations 14 6 provides for any phase-out or permanent taint of
material participation status. Congress demonstrated an ability to mod-
ify the material participation test for distinct categories of activities and
taxpayers (e.g., real estate, 147 limited partners, 148 and most pertinent to
this point, redefining the statutory test for a personal service corpora-
tion). 149 It is, therefore, reasonable to infer congressional intent for
uniform treatment of non-personal and personal service corporations,
as well as limiting modification of the material participation test (i.e.,
recharacterization) to intentional tax motivated manipulation. Whether
this regulation goes so far as to be considered an abuse of discretion
remains to be seen.
4. Quality v. Quantity- What is Material Participation?
The regulations define a material participant in a strictly quantita-
tive manner. While quantitative criteria provide administrative efficien-
cies, 150 this is a questionable interpretation of the congressional intent
behind material participation. A rigid quantitative approach is contrary
to the congressional intent expressed in the 1986 Senate Finance Com-
mittee's Report, which provides that "[t]he presence or absence of mate-
rial participation generally is to be determined with reference to all the
relevant facts and circumstances." 15 1 Section 469's material participa-
tion standard was patterned after the concept's usage within sections
1402(a) 152 and 2032A. 15 3 However, precedents under these sections
were considered too lenient and, therefore, not intended to control the
concept's interpretation with regard to the passive loss rules. 154
However, while the example qualifying this caveat emphasized a
stricter standard, it in no way rejected the analytical framework for the
material participation concept developed by these precedents. 155 The
145. I.R.C. § 469(h)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
146. Id. § 469(h)(4), (j)(2).
147. Id. § 469(c)(2).
148. Id. § 469(h)(2).
149. Id. § 469(j)(2).
150. See Gunnar, Current and Quotable: Gunnar Questions 'Quantitative'Approach
to Material Participation, 38 TAX NOTES 192 (1988).
151. 1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 732.
152. For a further discussion of § 1402 and its regulations, see supra note
35.
153. For a discussion of § 2032A and its regulation, see supra note 36.
154. See 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 237.
155. The legislative history emphasizes:
[W]hether or not, under existing authorities interpreting § 1402(a) and
§ 2032A, it could be argued that the material participation requirement
(for purposes of these sections) is in certain circumstances satisfied by
periodic consultation with respect to management decisions, the stan-
dard under this provision is not satisfied thereby in the absence of reg-
ular, continuous, and substantial involvement in the operations.
1989] COMMENT 1199
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regulation's rejection of the analytical framework developed by these
precedents (which were guided by the regulations under sections
1402(a) and 2032A) reduces the legislative history's substantial refer-
ences to these sections to a nullity. Further, a more perceptive interpre-
tation of the legislative history points to the congressional intent to
adopt the judicial and regulatory analytical framework developed under
sections 1402(a) and 2032A. The parallel structure of section 469's leg-
islative history to the section 2032A regulations also indicates this in-
tent. The section 2032A regulations, which establish the material
participation analytical framework, provide:
No single factor is determinative of the presence of mate-
rial participation, but physical work and participation in management
decisions are the principalfactors to be considered. At a minimum, the
decedent and/or a family member must regularly advise or con-
sult with the other managing party on the operation of the busi-
ness. While they need not make all final management decisions
alone, the decedent and/or family members must participate in
making a substantial number of these decisions. Additionally,
production activities ...should be inspected regularly by the
family participant .... With farms [or] hotels .... the opera-
tion of which constitutes a trade or business, the participating
decedent or heirs maintaining his or her principal place of resi-
dence on the premises is a factor to consider in determining
whether overall participation is material.' 56
The 1986 Senate Finance Committee Report emphasized similar, if
not identical, factors as relevant to establishing material participation
under section 469. The factors listed by the 1986 Senate Report were:
the extent to which the taxpayer is present at the place or places where
the principal operations of the activity are conducted; the proximity of
the taxpayer's residence to the operations; and the actual participation
in supervisory tasks and management decisions (i.e., not merely ratifica-
tion of another's recommendations). 157
The case law and regulations under section 2032A have adopted a
facts-and-circumstances approach, with temporal participation an im-
portant, but not dispositive, element in the analysis. 158 While these
Id.
156. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(2) (1980) (emphasis added).
157. 1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 732-33.
158. See, e.g., Mangels v. United States, 828 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1987)
(finding material participation where participation constituted: (1) daily atten-
tion to farm market reports; (2) quarterly physical inspections-averaging two
hours per inspection; (3) monthly meetings with on-site manager-averaging
one hour; (4) annual planning meetings-averaging 1 /2 to 2 hours; (5) annual
post-harvest analysis-averaging four hours; (6) occasional long-term manage-
ment decisions); Estate of Sherrod v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 1057, 1060 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (finding material participation in timber farming business where "the
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precedents demonstrate a far more qualitative than quantitative con-
gressional design, the section 469 legislative history does recognize the
temporal element of material participation.1 59 While Congress contem-
plated a facts-and-circumstances approach, some objective criteria are
necessary to promote administrative efficiency and provide taxpayers
with certainty in their tax planning. 160 Regulations indicative of con-
gressional intent would strike a balance between these two competing
objectives. A balance between administrative efficiencies and congres-
sional intent only can be achieved if the Service and the courts allow the
facts-and-circumstances alternative to develop with a more qualitative
emphasis. ' 6 1 However, the regulations' exclusion of management activ-
decedent and his son had exercised management and control over the acreage
by paying the taxes ..., inspecting the timberland [on a regular basis], keeping
in contact with the adjoining landowners, negotiating rental agreements, and
deciding whether or not to retain or sell the property"), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1021 (1986); Estate of Ward v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 54, 57, 64-65 (1987)
(finding material participation where decedent owned family farm, exercised in-
dependent management decisions, and supervised daily operations from her
residence located on farm.).
These three cases represent a spectrum of participation. In Estate of Ward,
the decedent resided on the farm and had a regular, continuous and substantial
presence in the daily operations of the business. This level of participation is
consistent with the intended use of material participation.under § 469. How-
ever, Mangels represents the type of precedent which prompted Congress to ex-
pressly negate pre-existing legal standards under § 2032A. Mangels
demonstrates that "an intermitted role in management [which], while relevant,
does not establish material participation ...; [f]or example, the fact that one has
responsibility for making significant management decisions with respect to an
activity does not establish material participation even if one from time to time
exercises such responsibility." 1986 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 734.
159. For a discussion of § 469's legislative history, see Moriarty, supra note
132, at 11.
160. For a discussion of this issue, see Moriarty, supra note 132, at 11; see
also Evaul & Lipton, Current and Quotable: Evaul and Lipton Suggest 'Quantitative'
Approach to Defining Participation, 37 TAX NOTES 1276 (1987) (advocating quantita-
tive approach).
161. Some of the ABA's Section of Taxation members state:
There is no easy solution to this conflict between the desire for an easy-
to-administer quantitative test, particularly one which is consistent with
the rigorous material participation standard in § 469(h)(1), and the
need to provide relief in appropriate facts and circumstances. To re-
solve this conflict, we would suggest that the Regulations focus primar-
ily upon a facts and circumstances test which applies to taxpayers who
are involved in an activity for a minimal number of hours, while provid-
ing a "safe harbor" which may be elected by other taxpayers who par-
ticipate for a sufficient period during the year. If the emphasis in the
Regulations were placed on the facts and circumstances test in a man-
ner which is consistent with the legislative history of § 469, the safe
harbor could be a rigorous elective test which would apply only in situ-
ations in which the material participation test should be presumed to be
satisfied.
PASSIVE Loss TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 47.
1989] COMMENT 1201
39
Donnelly: How Section 469 Redefines the Tax Shelter - and How the Regulatio
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ities from accredited participation status eliminates the primary means
of qualitative participation necessary to meet this objective.
5. What Counts for Participation?
a. Management Activities Within the Facts-and-Circumstances
Alternative
The regulations, under the facts-and-circumstances alternative only,
exclude management services from being credited towards participation
unless: (1) the taxpayer was the activity's only participant who was com-
pensated for management services, and (2) the taxpayer performs more
hours of management services than any other participant.' 6 2 The regu-
lation is really an anti-abuse provision, designed to prevent manipula-
tion of a taxpayer's status via the cloak of managerial responsibilities.
The regulation accomplishes this objective by limiting accredited partic-
ipation to those activities which have a single identifiable manager.
The need for protective measures against manipulation and abuse
of management participation has direct and extensive support in the leg-
islative history. A footnote in the legislative history specifically states:
Experience in applying existing legal standards confirms that a
test based on participation in management is subject to manip-
ulation and creates frequent factual disputes between the tax-
payers and the Internal Revenue Service . . . . [W]hile the
Internal Revenue Service may argue.., that an investor is not
truly participating in management, such argument may be diffi-
cult to sustain in the absence of reliable direct evidence regard-
ing the investor's independence of judgment. Congress expects
that the material participation standard for purposes of the passive loss
rules, in light of its focus on the taxpayer's role in the actual operations,
will not be similarly subjected [sic] to manipulation and ambiguity. ' 6 3
The Service's regulation will certainly accomplish this objective.
However, the Service's response to this congressional concern failed to
recognize that Congress' remarks were made as a caveat (actually taking
the form of the above quoted footnote) to its overall intent to generally
treat "management functions ... no differently than [the] rendering [of]
other services or [the] performing [of] physical work with respect to the
activity. However, a merely formal or nominal participation in manage-
ment, in the absence of a genuine exefcise of independence, discretion
or judgment, does not constitute material participation."1 64 Therefore,
it is clear that Congress did not intend to exclude legitimate managerial
functions. However, the regulations would apparently not credit partici-
pation of an individual whose sole function was as a participant of the
162. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(b)(2)(ii)(A), (B) (1988).
163. 1986 BLUE BOOK, supra note 19, at 239 n.31 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 239.
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Board of Directors of his S Corporation, unless he was that activity's
only manager, or most active manager (two unlikely circumstances).
And as shown below, the taxpayer would probably not receive credit for
participation under the remaining alternatives unless his participation
amounted to day-to-day involvment or went beyond what the regula-
tions define as work done in the individual's capacity as an investor.
Therefore, the congressional direction to the Service was not to ex-
clude management services from the material participation calculation,
but rather to distinguish between genuine and contrived managerial po-
sitions. While the Service's position contradicts the congressional de-
sign for management services, a wholly facts-and-circumstances
approach would be equally inconsistent given the concerns expressed by
Congress. There is no easy resolution to the tension created by Con-
gress' desire to include management activities, but yet avoid abuses and
excessive litigation. However, the Service's approach is clearly weighted
in favor of avoiding abuse, without any concern for its impact on
legitmate managerial functions.
b. Limitations on What Counts for Participation in General
The first of two more general anti-abuse provisions covering all the
alternatives is the regulation which excludes investor-orientated func-
tions 165 from accredited participation status unless done in the context
of an individual who is directly involved in the day-to-day management
of operations of the activity. 166 While the facts-and-circumstances alter-
native allows management functions to be credited towards material
participation only when there is a single identifiable manager, these
overall participation regulations require day-to-day involvement. Why
provide two different standards within the same section? Is one more
lenient than the other? Can a taxpayer qualify under facts-and-circum-
stances with less than day-to-day involvement as long as he is the only
participant performing management activities? Can investor-orientated
functions qualify if the taxpayer is the only manager, but has less than
165. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(f)(2)(ii) (1988) provides:
(A) Work done by an individual in the individual's capacity as an
investor in an activity shall not be treated as participation in the activity
for purposes of this section unless the individual is directly involved in
the day to day management or operations of the activity.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph (0(2)(ii), work done by an in-
dividual in the individual's capacity as an investor in an activity in-
cludes-
(1) studying and reviewing financial statements or reports on op-
erations of the activity;
(2) preparing or compiling summaries or analysis of the finances
or operations of the activity for the individual's own use; and
(3) monitoring the finances or operations of the activity in a non-
managerial capacity.
166. Id. § l.469-5T(f)(2)(ii)(A).
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day-to-day involvement? The answers, if any, are unclear, adding fur-
ther complexity to an already confused area.
Of greater concern than the implications of these apparently con-
flicting criteria is the regulation's requirement of direct involvement in
the day-to-day management or operations of the activity in order for any
"investor-type" activities to be credited as participation. 167 Where a
single operation is involved, determining day-to-day involvement is rela-
tively simple. However, where the taxpayer is involved with multiple
operations, characterization as either a single activity or multiple activi-
ties would presumably impact upon the taxpayer's ability to satisfy the
day-to-day involvement criteria. Therefore, the first step in resolving
such a problem would necessitate reference to the recently issued activ-
ity regulations. 1 68
Failing the ability to demonstrate day-to-day involvement in the ac-
tivity, the next step would be to structure the taxpayer's activities
outside the regulation's definition of investor-type activity. The regula-
tions define investor-type activity as either: (1) reviewing financial state-
ments; (2) preparing financial summaries for the investor's own use; or
(3) monitoring finances or operations in a non-managerial capacity. 169
The first example makes it clear that merely reviewing the numbers will
not suffice as participation. However, the second example does leave an
opening by way of its reference to the investor's own use. It is probable
that preparation time could suffice if the investor had enough foresight
to create an outside need for the information-for example, a lendor
who required monthly financial statements for monitoring conditions
tied to its loan. This would presumably take the participation outside
the scope of investor-type activity and, thereby, allow such participation
to count without a corresponding day-to-day involvement by the tax-
payer. However, this line of reasoning could fail as a sham if it were
found that the reports were primarily for the taxpayer's use, or that the
lendor did not customarily require such information.
The regulations recharacterize any participation in an activity which
is not of a type customarily done by an owner of such an activity or
engaged in with a tax-avoidance purpose.170 A prime example would be
the sports franchise owner who sends his wife to work as a secretary for
the ball club in order to secure material participation status. The wife's
participation, which could otherwise be aggregated with the husband's,
will be disallowed because owners do not customarily function as secre-
taries, and the participation was motivated by a tax-manipulation pur-
pose. Here, the regulation's focus on intent conforms to the
congressional design for recharacterization.
167. Id.
168. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4T, 54 Fed. Reg. 20,527-66 (1989).
169. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(0(2)(ii)(B)(1)-(3) (1988).
170. Id. § 1.469-5T(f)(2)(i)(A).
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The two most elusive concepts of the passive activity rules are "ma-
terial participation" and "activity." Together, these concepts can be ex-
pected to be the subject of many disputes and to engender substantial
litigation before being honed into understandable concepts for taxpay-
ers and their representatives.
The quantitative approach espoused in the regulations' definition of
material participation, depending as it does on the number of hours
worked at a particular activity, would seem to impose a substantial rec-
ord-keeping burden on taxpayers. Evidently in response to concerns
about the record-keeping burden expressed during the Senate floor de-
bates, 17 1 the regulations 172 state that contemporaneous daily time
records are not necessary if material participation can be established by
other reasonable means. The regulations then go on to suggest that
other reasonable means include such things as appointment books and
calendars (records akin to contemporaneous daily time records). It is
171. See 132 CONG. REC. S7471 (daily ed. June 13, 1986). It states:
Mr. Andrews. Mr. President, in reading the committee report on
the tax bill's passive loss section that the Senator from Nebraska and
the Senator from New York had their recent colloquy on, I see a great
deal of ambiguity on the definition of material participation that could
raise havoc on the family farms of America.
Let me share with you, Mr. President, where my concern lies.
These characters in the Internal Revenue Service would not know
a steer from a heifer. They have no idea of how an American farm
works. They are the ones who wanted us to start a log book on the use of the
family farm pickup.
Mr. President, that pickup on the average farm is used by our kids,
by our uncles, by our cousins, by our hired men. You get into it and
you run out into the field with some fuel for a swather. Someone else
gets into it and runs to the elevator for a moisture test. Someone else
gets into it and goes into town for repairs. There is no way you can keep a
log.
We made the point. We made it here in this body. Even though we
passed legislation correcting it they interpreted it and they reinterpreted it and they
misinterpreted it and we had to correct it yet again within the last month.
Mr. President, in this passive loss section they have done it again.
The regulations, as I pointed out earlier, that the IRS published in the matter
of loss on the farm family pickup were totally contrary to the intent of Congress
and, for this reason, tax counselors continue to advise their clients to keep contem-
poraneous auto record logs.
Id. (emphasis added).
172. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(f)(4) (1988) provides:
The extent of an individual's participation in an activity may be
established by any reasonable means. Contemporaneous daily time re-
ports, logs or similar documents are not required if the extent of such
participation may be established by other reasonable means. Reason-
able means for purposes of this paragraph may include but are not lim-
ited to the identification of services performed over a period of time
and the approximate number of hours spent performing such services
during such period, based on appointment books, calendars, or narra-
tive summaries.
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difficult to surmise what type of evidence would suffice if it is not a time
record or some other type of record from which time spent can be re-
constructed. Until audits and cases commence, little will be known
about what type of proof will be required. In some cases taxpayers may
resort to the facts-and-circumstances test. However, if the quantitative
tests are not met, the results are problematic.
This Comment has been designed to place the passive activity rules
in perspective with other Code provisions and to provide a starting
point from which passive activity loss issues can be identified and
planned for, and from which alternative positions to the regulations can
be explored. While any regulation will have some possible alternative
positions, the passive loss regulations are particularly susceptible to
valid criticisms due to numerous interpretations which embellish the
statute well beyond its intended scope. However, despite numerous in-
stances of overreaching, the task of challenging any legislative regula-
tion is a formidable one. And, since the passive loss rules only defer
rather than deny deductions, the inclination to challenge could be
reduced.
The winds of change have taken a sharp turn with the adoption of
the passive loss rules. Since the attractiveness of a tax shelter depends
on the bunching of tax losses in the early years of operation, the passive
loss rules will likely satisfy the desire of Congress to deter primarily tax-
motivated transactions. At the same time, however, the passive loss
rules will deny tax deductions for losses of businesses which were not
designed and could never be classified as tax shelters. It is inevitable
that unintended and unfair results will follow, and that changes will be




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 6 [1989], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/4
